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ABSTRACT 
 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation investigates the firms’ restructuring choice between 
minority carve-outs and tracking stocks using samples during 1990-2001. The extra 
compensation from the restructured units, the liquidity conditions, and the preservation of 
synergy are the significant factors determining a firm’s restructuring decision. Additional 
compensation seems to be a major driving force behind restructuring via tracking stock. One 
year after the restructuring, the executive compensation of the tracking stock group increases 
by 241% compared to 32% for the carve-out sample. In spite of the significant increase in the 
compensation, the three-year buy-and-hold return for tracking stock parents is more negative 
than that of the carve-out parents. Thus, if the extra compensation was designed to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders, the goal did not materialize. The primary motive 
behind restructuring through carve-outs is to control the liquidity problem. Although the 
operating performance of the parents of either group does not improve three years after the 
restructuring, the long-term stock performance of carve-out parents improves when a 
restructured unit is less related to the parent.  
Chapter 2 of the dissertation compares the degree of overreaction between value 
stocks and growth stocks using the implied volatility from option prices. Applying Stein’s 
(1989) mean reversion model and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst’s (1994) GARCH and 
EGARCH methods, I compare the theoretical and empirical measures of reaction of long-
term options in respect to short-term options for the growth and the value portfolios, which 
are separately classified by price-to-book and price-to-earning ratios. The evidence suggests 
that growth portfolios largely overreact to a greater degree than the value portfolios assuming 
mean reversion, GARCH, and EGARCH models. The findings potentially explain why value 
stocks outperform growth stocks in the long run, lending support to overreaction as an 
explanation for the value effect. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
FIRM’S CHOICE BETWEEN EQUITY CARVE-OUT AND TRACKING STOCK AS 
A RESTRUCTURING VEHICLE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Three well-known forms of restructuring are spin offs, equity carve-outs, and tracking 
stocks. Equity carve-out is the public offering of shares of a formerly non-publicly traded 
subsidiary of a parent firm. Minority equity carve-out occurs when the parent carves out only 
a minority interest and still maintains a majority interest in the subsidiary after the 
restructuring. It combines characteristics of both restructuring and financing transactions as 
the parent sells a portion of its ownership in a subsidiary via an initial public offering (IPO). 
Shareholders in the new firm typically have the right to elect a board of directors, the right to 
vote on matters of significant importance, and a claim on the firm’s net assets, though the 
same director might serve on the board of the parent as well as the board of the carved out 
subsidiary.  
Tracking stock or targeted stock, in contrast, is a class of a diversified company’s 
common stock created to track the performance of a particular business unit. Tracking stock 
does not represent direct ownership interest in the targeted business, but rather an ownership 
interest in the entire company. The shares are distributed to current shareholders on a pro-rata 
basis or sold through an IPO. Unlike spin-off or equity carve-out, a tracking stock does not 
create a new legal entity. The businesses represented by the tracking stocks remain part of the 
consolidated entity and share a common board of shareholders. Shareholders of a tracking 
stock do not elect directors to oversee management of the tracked business, nor do they have 
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a claim against the assets of the tracked group. A tracking stock can be issued for a business 
division, geographic segment, product line or any other separable business. 
Spin off is vastly different from equity carve out and tracking stock due to its absolute 
change in control after restructuring. Spin-offs create new and distinct equity claims over the 
assets and result in a complete divestiture of assets by the parents. Usually the parent offers 
subsidiary shares to existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis. As such it does not entail new 
equity flows to the parent company. After restructuring, the spun-off subsidiary becomes an 
independent company with a separate board of directors and management team.  
A carve-out unit or tracking-stock unit continues to maintain relationship with the 
parent firm, while a spin-off results in an independent company. In this dissertation, I attempt 
to answer the question as to how a firm chooses between two similar restructuring choices—
carve-out vs. tracking stock. Several motives have been proposed in the literature to explain 
these two choices.  Proponents of restructuring argue that tracking stock or equity carve-out 
may be used as a tool to mitigate agency problems by reducing information asymmetry and 
improving managerial incentives through publicly traded equity claims on a subsidiary. Prior 
studies of equity carve-outs and tracking stocks document a positive short-term share price 
reaction to the announcement of the restructuring. However, the long-term stock returns 
subsequent to either carve-outs or tracking stocks do not outperform the market, neither do 
the operating performances of the parents following the restructuring. If tracking stock and 
carve-out can both enable the parents to realize the proposed benefits and exhibit similar 
change in performance after restructuring, what factors actually differentiate the two 
restructuring choices and motive the managers to choose one over the other? It is important to 
answer this question as there might be motivations overlooked by the prior literature that 
mitigate the potential benefits of restructuring and may even hurt the shareholders’ interests, 
leading to a decline in the stock and operating performance. 
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An important distinguishing factor between the two restructuring alternatives is that 
their control mechanisms are different despite of their apparent similarity. The tracking 
division is not a separate legal entity: typically the same board of directors manages the 
parent and the tracking subsidiary. In contrast, in an equity carve-out, boards and managers 
are separate. Tracking unit stockholders can enforce neither claims on assets nor control 
mechanisms, therefore there might be potential conflicts and inter-firm wealth transfers 
between the tracking division and the rest of the firm. Hass (1996) suggests that the 
shareholders of the parent firm might benefit at the expense of the shareholders of the 
tracking units.  
While prior studies examine the stock performance of tracking stocks and carve-outs, 
this paper focuses on the choice between the two and uses samples over a longer period than 
the previous literature.  The scope of this study is broader in that it examines the efficacy of 
corporate governance aspects, agency problems, liquidity condition, preservation of synergy, 
and other motives behind a firm’s choice between carve-outs and tracking stocks. Another 
issue I address in this essay is whether the motives behind each choice achieve their intended 
purpose. I investigate this issue by relating restructuring choice to the long-term stock and 
operating performance. The findings would have implications for managers in making a 
restructuring choice and for investors in making investment decisions. The empirical 
evidence shows that firms engaging in minority carve outs need funds and intend to remain 
focused by carving out less-related subsidiaries. On the other hand, gaining extra 
compensation from tracking stocks and tracking stock options is a significant factor 
motivating the managers to choose tracking stocks. Although the stock and operating 
performances of both tracking stocks and carve-out parents deteriorate three years following 
the restructuring, the tracking stock group underperforms the carve-out group at the 5% 
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significance level. The overriding consideration of additional compensation for the tracking 
stock group might explain the underperformance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a detailed 
literature survey including the short-term and the long-term stock performance as well as the 
operating performance following the two forms of restructuring. Section three develops 
hypotheses. Section four describes the sample and research methodology. Section five 
presents the empirical findings and the last section concludes. 
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II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
II.1. History of Equity Carve-outs and Tracking Stocks 
 
Equity carve-out used to be very popular with average yearly volumes of more than 
$20 billion between 1995 and 2000 because of the positive shareholders’ reaction. (Annema, 
Fallon and Goedhart, 2001). Studies found that vast majority of carve-outs ultimately lead to 
changes in corporate control, and very few produce significant share price increases for the 
parent unless the parent company follows a plan to subsequently fully separate the carved-out 
subsidiary.  
Despite the extensive use of tracking stock structure in 1999, eight companies 
announced their tracking stock proposal but withdrew later in 2000. A majority of these 
companies are technology companies or the companies hoping to unlock the value of their 
internet businesses because of the decline of the information technology sector. Since then 
the trend to eliminate tracking stock has also spread to other non-internet businesses that have 
had tracking stock for a long time. For instance, Pittston, which adopted tracking stock in 
1993 to provide shareholders with separate securities that would reflect its major business 
groups, eliminated the structure in 2000. Georgia Pacific, who used tracking stock in 1997 to 
separate the performance of its manufacturing and timberland businesses, received 
shareholder approval to sell off the targeted stock for its timber business at a special 
shareholders’ meeting in August 2001. Cendant and Quantum also sold off the tracking 
divisions in early 2001. Cendant selling the business of its move.com tracking stock to 
homestore.com and Quantum selling the business hard disk drive tracking stock to Maxtor. 
Walt Disney also closed its Web portal: Go.com, eliminating its online tracking stock. 
Nevertheless, in 2001, Worldcom adopted the tracking stock structure intended to reflect the 
separate performance of its Worldcom and MCI businesses.  
 6
II.2. Short-Term Stock Performance 
Prior studies find a positive stock reaction to the announcement of issuing tracking 
stock. Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996), Zuta (2000), Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000), Elder 
and Westra (2000), D’Souza and Jacob (2000) and Haushalter and Mikkelson (2001) all 
report a favorable market response to firms that issued tracking stocks in recent years. 
Similarly, announcements of equity carve-outs produce positive stock returns for parent firms 
(Schipper and Smith, (1986); Anslinger at al. (1997); Allen and McConnell (1998); Vijh 
(2002); and Madura and Nixon (2002)). Schipper and Smith (1986) suggest that favorable 
returns to the parent firm from carve-outs may be attributable to a wealth transfer from 
bondholders as carve-outs eliminate assets of the carved-out units as collateral and shifts 
wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Anslinger at al. (1997) and Vijh (2002) interpret 
the positive average announcement effects as motivated largely by efficiency gains from the 
more efficient contracts between shareholders and managers and the creation of pure-play 
stocks. Allen and McConnell (1998) and Madura and Nixon (2002) particularly indicate that 
firms that pay out the proceeds from carve-out to creditors or shareholders have significantly 
greater abnormal returns than their counterparts that retain the proceeds.  
 
II.3. Long-Term Performance 
II.3.1. Stock performance 
Researchers have investigated whether positive announcement returns are reflective 
of long-term performance of restructuring firms. Michaely and Shaw (1995) and Madura and 
Nixon (2002) find that carve-out parent firms underperform the market substantially 
subsequent to carve-outs. Madura and Nixon (2002) further indicate that the long-term 
performance of parents is more unfavorable for those that were distressed before the carve-
outs. They suggest that while the carve-out serves as a source of funds for distressed firms, it 
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does not necessarily alleviate the distress. In addition, the carved-out units of these parents 
may contain a portion of the distress symptoms as well.  
However, Vijh (1999) and Powers (2002) report that carve-out subsidiaries do not 
show significant positive or negative long-run return. Vijh (1999) finds that the newly issued 
subsidiary stocks do not underperform appropriate benchmarks over a three-year period 
following the carve-out. 1  Powers (2002) reports that the three-year stock returns of the 
carved-out subsidiaries are not significantly different from the returns of size and book-to-
market matched comparison firms.  
While Billett and Vijh (2002) and Clayton and Qian (2002) find that the parents of 
tracking stock firms are neutral performers, who do not significantly under- or over-perform 
the market, the evidence on long-term performance of tracking stocks is mixed. Chemmanur 
and Paeglis (2000) and Billett and Vijh (2002) find that tracking stocks generally 
underperform relative to industry and market benchmarks.2 In contrast to the market indexes 
used in Billett and Vijh (2000) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) as the benchmark, 
Clayton and Qian (2002) use matching samples to control for industry, book-to-market, price-
to-earnings, and size, and find that tracking stocks do not significantly under- or over- 
perform benchmarks over the three years following the introduction. The buy-and-hold 
excess return of tracking stocks is positive relative to three of the four benchmarks, but 
insignificantly different from zero based on all the benchmarks.3 In addition, Clayton and 
Qian (2002) show some evidence that the combined parent and tracking unit performance is 
                                                
1Vijh (1999) examines the long-term excess returns of carve-outs with reference to the market portfolio and the 
size, book-to-market, industry, and earnings-to-price matching firms.  
2Billett and Vijh (2000) show that tracking stocks earn negative buy-and-hold excess returns during a three-year 
period following the issue date. Parent firms earn significantly negative excess returns during the year before the 
announcement of tracking stocks. 
3The four benchmarks in Clayton and Qian (2002) are as follows: (1) the value weighted market return from 
CRSP, (2) a matching sample of stocks based on industry and size, (3) a matching sample of stocks based on 
size and book-to-market ratio, and (4) a matching samples of stocks based on size and earnings-to-price ratio. 
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better relative to the benchmarks for the three years following the issuance of a tracking 
stock.  
II.3.2. Operating performance 
If the restructuring via carve-outs or tracking stocks creates value, then the firm’s 
operating performance should improve. However, the empirical evidence on the parents of 
carve-out firms is inconsistent with this expectation. Powers (2003) shows that parents that 
carve out subsidiaries consistently underperform their matching samples and have 
significantly higher leverage than the matching sample. The operating performance of a 
carve- out subsidiary peaks at issue, and declines significantly thereafter.  
Regarding the evidence on tracking stocks, Haushalter and Mikkelson (2001) find that 
restructuring via tracking stock does not improve operating performance of the parent, the 
tracking unit, or of the two units combined.4 Loh (2001) finds that issuing firms of tracking 
stocks have significant underperformance prior to the issuance and continue to underperform 
their industry peers following the issuance, though the underperformance is smaller when 
compared to the pre-issuance period. The gap in profitability is especially pronounced over 
the one-year period just before the announcement of the issuance of the trackers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Haushalter and Mikkelson (2001) conclude that restructurings that do not relinquish control over assets would 
not bring about improvements in operating performance. 
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The similarity between tracking stock and carve-out structure and the mixed evidence 
of long-term stock and operating performance of the parent firms raise two questions: 
“What factors actually motivate the firms to choose one over the other?” and  
“Are there specific factors that lead to the changes in long term stock and operating 
performance?” 
Proponents of tracking stock argue that tracking stock may be used as a tool to retain 
and recruit employees by providing compensation through stock options or bonuses that are 
tied to the performance or market value of the tracking stock. It also reduces the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors as the increasing coverage from the analysts on 
the tracking units allows investors to gain a better understanding of the value of business, and 
thereby may broaden the investor base. The carve-out structure potentially offers the parent 
firm similar benefits. However, as all carve-outs are initial public offerings and provide cash 
to the parent firms while only few issuers initially offer tracking stocks to the public, the 
fund-raising motive plays a strong role in carve-out decisions.  
In the following section, I will review the motivations documented in the literature 
that could potentially give rise to value and performance increments following the carve-out 
and tracking stock. These motivations include corporate control and incentive considerations 
in terms of managerial alignment and agency issues, asymmetric information, preservation of 
synergy, and liquidity conditions. A contribution of the dissertation is to add another motive - 
corporate control and incentive issues which has been largely ignored in previous literature. 
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III.1. Managerial alignment motives 
From a corporate governance point of view, corporate restructuring can create value 
for shareholders through better managerial motivation by allowing closer alignment of 
compensation with performance.  A way to motivate divisional managers to make value-
enhancing decisions is by linking their compensation to the performance of the division they 
manage.5  The less related the parent and the division, the more difficult to motivate the 
managers based on the parent’s overall performance. Zuta (2000) argues that divisional 
managers’ performance can be better measured and accordingly compensated with the 
tracking stock. The improved incentive will in turn lead to improved operating performance. 
On the other hand, in the case of carve-out, it is less likely that the parent divisional managers 
are compensated with the stocks of the restructured units after the carve-out, thus the parents’ 
motive of using carve-out as a way of aligning the divisional managers’ interest with 
performance is weak.    
I hypothesize managerial alignment motive is a major factor that leads the firm to 
choose tracking stock over carve-out. If tracking stock is an effective means of motivating the 
divisional managers, I expect a positive relationship between the managerial incentives and 
the performance of firms that engage in tracking stocks or carve-outs. The positive 
relationship will be stronger for the tracking stock firms than for the carve-out firms as the 
tracking unit remains intact after the restructuring. 
III.2. Managerial Entrenchment 
Higher agency problem for tracking-stock firms stems from the common board for the 
parent and the subsidiary. Harper and Madura (2002) also imply that the ultimate impact of 
the creation of tracking stock on shareholders depends on managerial intentions. If managers 
really use tracking stocks as a means to increase efficiency, then the shareholders will benefit. 
                                                
5Schipper and Smith (1986) find that majority of the carve-out subsidiaries adopt incentive based 
compensation plans on the subsidiary’s stock price. 
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If managers use it as a way of increasing their compensation for a short-term benefit, then the 
market will realize its true value in the long run. The managerial self-serving motives might 
be more severe in the case of tracking stock than that of carve-out as the same board of 
directors can be compensated with tracking stock related compensation. I hypothesize that the 
portion of executive compensation derived from the restructured unit increases significantly 
after the creation of tracking stock and it is a major factor influencing the firm’s restructuring 
decision. 
Tracking stock managers can better act in their self-interests if certain corporate 
governance aspects are met. Assuming that parent managers derive utility through private 
benefits of control that is an increasing function of the percentage of shares owned by the 
parent, proportionate holdings of tracking stocks and parent stocks would motivate mangers 
to maximize the market value of the combined firm, and disproportionate holdings would 
promote them to increase one stock price at the expense of the other. If officers own a 
relatively large proportion of the parent, they might be more interested in the restructuring 
decisions that lead to the value creation of the parent. By the same token, institutional 
investors are more capable monitors of firms than individual investors because they have a 
larger investment at stake and better access to information. Thus, the larger the institutional 
ownership of a parent firm the more likely it is that the parent firm will engage in 
performance enhancing decisions.  
Other corporate governance factors such as the number of directors on the parent’s 
board may reflect the degree of control that the board members have on the parent. Jensen 
(1993) suggests that the effectiveness of the board is inversely related to the number of 
directors as he contends that smaller boards tend to be more efficient. Madura and Nixon 
(2002) find that the short-term valuation effects of carve-out parents are inversely and 
significantly related to the board size, suggesting more favorable effects for parents overseen 
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by smaller numbers of board member. However, they did not make the comparison for the 
case between carve-out and tracking stock. 
If managerial self-serving interests play a major role in the restructuring decision for 
tracking stock parents, then I expect to see lower insider holdings, lower monitoring role of 
the institutional investors, and a larger board of directors for tracking stock structure than for 
the carve-out structure.  
III.3.  Reduction of information asymmetry 
One underlying reason for the existence of the agency problem is the information 
asymmetry problem between the shareholders and managers. It can be mitigated through 
increased transparency of managers’ actions resulting from separate financial statements and 
publicly traded carve-out equity and the increased level of disclosure of the tracking units. 
Carve-out may function as a marketing device to increase the visibility of the parent as well 
as of the carve-out division. Increased visibility of the firm could lead to increased analyst 
coverage and higher liquidity. Schipper and Smith (1986) argue that equity carve-outs 
enhance the value of a firm as the separation of a subsidiary from a parent can mitigate the 
problem of asymmetric information between managers and investors. Over time, the 
reduction in asymmetric information may lead to a more accurate market perception of 
performance by the now independently traded units. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) and Fu 
(2002) show that information asymmetry between managers and investors is reduced after 
equity carve-outs. Measuring information asymmetry by the probability of information-based 
trading using a sequential trade microstructure model, Fu (2002) also shows that the 
reduction in information asymmetry is positively related to the abnormal returns around 
carve-out announcements. 
A tracking stock also provides a structure to reveal more information about the 
restructured unit. However, the evidence related to asymmetric information theory is mixed. 
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While Zuta (2000) find increased analyst coverage, D’Souza and Jacob (2000) find no 
significant increase in the number of analysts covering firms following tracking stock 
issuance. Billett and Vijh (2000) also find that, for a three-year period following tracking 
stock creation, forecasts by analysts do not improve the transparency of firm earnings.6  
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) make a comparison of information asymmetry variables 
among tracking stocks, carve outs, and spin-offs and find some, though not significant, 
decline in the information asymmetry for carve-out and spin-off samples but not for the 
tracking stock sample. They indicate that while the number of analysts increases, there is no 
reduction in information asymmetry, as forecast errors increase after issuance of tracking 
stocks. They interpret the conflicting findings as a result of imperfect proxies for asymmetric 
information. In this paper, I hypothesize that firms create carve-out or tracking stock units to 
reduce information asymmetry.  
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) state that the parent and subsidiaries of the tracking 
stock group are more related than those of the carve-out group. Assuming the information 
asymmetry in a more diversified firm is higher than the counterpart, I hypothesize that the 
information asymmetry of the carve-out parent is higher than that of tracking stock group. If 
the parents with high information asymmetry prior to the restructuring effectively reduce the 
information asymmetry after the restructuring, then their long-term stock and operating 
performance should improve.  
III.4. Preservation of synergy 
Another angle to look at the level of information asymmetry is to investigate the 
closeness of the parent with the restructured units. If the parent and the restructured units are 
closely related, the level of information asymmetry is expected to be lower than when the 
restructuring unit is not related. The closeness of the parent and the subsidiaries can bring 
                                                
6 Billett and Vijh (2000) examine three measures of firm transparency: the magnitude of earnings forecast 
errors, the dispersion of earnings forecasts across analysts, and the magnitude of market reaction to actual 
earnings announcements. 
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potential benefits described as synergies. The subsidiary may share the use of assets and 
enjoy the relatively low financing costs with the parent. On the other hand, the managerial 
and operational inefficiencies between parent and subsidiaries or the so-called negative 
synergies can be eliminated through restructuring and enable the parent to be focused. 
Different from spin-off, in which the spun off division is a separate identity with no 
tie with the parent, firms engaged in carve-out or tracking stock might actually try to preserve 
the synergies between business units. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) find that the tracking 
stock parents and subsidiaries are more related than those of spin-offs and carve-outs. Billet 
and Mauer (2000) find that firms creating tracking stocks have lower diversification 
discounts than the matching diversified firms as measured by the excess value of a firm 
relative to a portfolio of industry-matched single segment firms, consistent with the view that 
tracking stock structure maintains positive synergy within the diversified firms.  
However, the maintenance of positive synergies comes at the expense of less 
focusing. Carve-out is not likely to be a good option of restructuring if there are still positive 
operating or strategic synergies between the parent and the carved-out subsidiary. Legal 
protections for the public minority shareholders typically demand that all transactions with 
the parent company take place at fair market terms and conditions as if it were between two 
independent entities (Annema, Fallon, and Goedhart, 2001). This greatly reduces the 
flexibility and ease with which parent and the carved out subsidiaries can cooperate to 
capture any synergies. Since tracking stock firms retain complete control of the tracking 
units, I hypothesize that the tracking unit is more related to the parent than is the case for 
equity carve-out. 
III.5. Liquidity and other motives 
Other than agency related issues, the financial condition of the parent may influence 
the restructuring decision. Since the most obvious motive for equity offerings is to raise 
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external capital, an equity carve-out in this sense is comparable to an asset sale (Lang, 
Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). Previous evidence shows that firms selling assets have high 
leverage and exhibit poor performance. Allen and McConnell (1998) and Anderson (2002)) 
enhance the finding by stating that parent firms are financially constrained before a carve-out 
offering. Furthermore, Powers (2002) finds that liquidity constrained parents as measured by 
low interest coverage ratio and acid test ratio sell a greater percentage of carve-out subsidiary 
shares and the percentage of subsidiary shares sold by parents is negatively related to 
subsequent changes in subsidiary operating performance as well as long-term excess return to 
equity. He suggests that the financing rationale plays an important role in motivating equity 
carve-outs. In contrast, only a small portion of tracking stocks is issued through IPO. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that the carve-out parents are in more immediate need for cash and 
their liquidity is poorer than the tracking stock counterparts.  
The need for cash might be a result of higher growth or level of investment. Thus 
firms’ choice between carve-out and tracking stock might be influenced by factors that 
represent operating performance such as growth opportunities and profitability of the parent 
firms. Loh (2001) notes that deteriorating performance, at least in part, is responsible for a 
firm’s decision to issue tracking stock. If carve-out decision is made as to raise funds for the 
parent to finance past investment, the parent firm before restructuring might be highly 
leveraged and financially distressed but at the same time has high growth potential. If the 
growth potential is realized in the future, then the long-term stock performance of the carve-
out firms should improve. Since the majority of tracking stock issuance is not associated with 
a cash flow, I hypothesize that the carve-out parents have greater growth potential and lower 
profitability before restructuring than the tracking stock parents. 
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In summary, hypotheses to be tested are as follows.  
Table 1:  
 
Hypotheses Summarized 
 
 
Factors    Hypotheses 
 
Managerial  
Alignment The tracking stock parents show a stronger motive of using 
restructuring to align the managers’ interests with performance than 
the carve-out parents. 
 
Managerial   
Entrenchment The executives of the tracking stock parents derive higher additional 
compensation from the restructured units after the restructuring than 
the carve-out counterpart. 
 
The tracking stock parents show a lower level of insider ownership 
than the carve-out counterparts before restructuring. 
 
The tracking stock parents show a lower level of institutional 
ownership than the carve-out counterparts before restructuring. 
 
The tracking stock parents show a larger board than the carve-out 
counterparts before restructuring. 
 
Information  
Asymmetry The carve-out parents show a higher level of information asymmetry 
than the tracking stock parents before restructuring.  
 
Relatedness The tacking stock parents are more related to the restructured 
subsidiaries than the carve-out counterparts. 
 
Liquidity The tracking stock parents have better liquidity than the carve-out 
counterparts before restructuring. 
 
Growth Potential The tracking stock parents have lower growth potential than the carve-
out counterparts before restructuring. 
 
Profitability The tracking stock parents have higher profitability than the carve-out 
counterparts before restructuring. 
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IV. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
IV.1  Sample Selection and Characteristics  
My carve-out as well as tracking stock samples start from 1990 because all but two 
tracking stocks created before 1990.7  The initial samples of 237 equity carve-outs and 52 
tracking stocks announcements between 1990 and 2001 are derived from SDC database and 
cross-checked with Lexis/Nexis. For the carve-out sample, I focus on only the minority 
carve-outs in which the parents maintain over 50% of the ownership in the restructured units. 
I first delete the companies that conducted repeated carve outs and cross checked with 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to ensure 
there are sufficient financial statements data and executive compensation and stock data 
available for further analysis. This reduces the carve-out sample to 57 firms. Table 2 shows 
the dates of the initial public offering, ownership before and after the carve-outs for the 
carve-out sample. 
Table 2:  
 
Summary of Minority Equity Carve-outs for the Period of 1990 –2001  
 
Parent Corporation   Date        Ownership        Ownership   Industry of  
             Before       After   Parent 
      Carve-outs      Carve-outs 
  
Citicorp financial guaranty  910711  100  50.3 Insurance 
Thermo electron Corp.   910724  84.4  69.7 Service 
Rogers communications Inc.  910808  100  85.1  Telecom 
Pier 1 imports Inc.   911004  100  60 Retail 
Manor Care Inc.   920303  100  81 Healthcare 
American medical technologies  920414  100  63 Sanitation 
St. Paul Cos Inc.   920519  100  74        Investment Bank 
Citibank NA    921216  100  82 Banking 
Sears Roebuck & Co   930222  100  82.2 Wholesale 
Sears Roebuck & Co   930602  100  82.1 Wholesale 
Genzyme Corp.    930709  100  73 Manufacturing 
TAT Technologies Ltd.   930806  94  58 Manufacturing 
DUN & Bradstreet Corp.  931005  78  57 Service 
Aquila Energy    931019  100  81.6 Oil/gas pipeline 
                                                
7 General Motors started two tracking stock issues in 1984 
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Table 2(Continued) 
Summary of Minority Equity Carve-outs for the Period of 1990 –2001  
 
Parent Corporation   Date        Ownership        Ownership   Industry of  
             Before       After   Parent 
      Carve-outs      Carve-outs 
  
Textron Inc.    931026  100  83 Insurance 
Maxco Inc.    940223  100  71.7 Wholesale 
Sepracor Inc.    940325  100  57.1 Manufacturing 
Sepracor Inc.     940407  100  58.0 Manufacturing 
Jefferies group Inc.   940504  100  82.2     Investment Bank 
ITT Corp.    941220  100  86.6 Service 
AMBAC Inc.    950222  95.9  72.5 Service 
American united global Inc.  950613  100  59.9 Wholesale 
Medicore Inc.    960417  99.1  67 Healthcare 
Du Pont    960613  100  72 Chemical 
Imperial credit industries Inc.  960613  100  62.6 Securities 
ThermoTrex    960627  92.3  80        Manufacturing 
Elbit Ltd.    960703  78.1  59.2     Manufacturing 
Capital bank    960710  100  83 Banking 
National city Corp.   960808  100  87 Service 
Tridex Corp.    960822  100  82.4     Manufacturing 
WMS Industries   961030  100  86.8 Service 
Commodore Environmental Service 970403  100  87        Manufacturing 
Palomar Medical   970408  87.4  67.7     Manufacturing 
Aura Systems Inc.   970915  94  75        Manufacturing 
American Software Inc.   971007  100  83.7 Service 
Torchmark Corp.   980304  100  89        Investment Bank 
Zapata Corp.    980402  100  64.1 Agriculture 
Silicon Graphics Inc.   980629  100  85.2     Manufacturing 
Creative Computers Inc.  981203  100  82.3 Retail 
Kushner-Locke Co.   990625  86  55.2 Service 
Williams Cos Inc.   991001  100  86 Telecom 
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. 991007  95.2  65 Real Estate 
PSINet Inc.    991215  99.6  82.6 Service 
AT&T Corp.    000426  100  84.4 Telecom 
Northern states power Co.  000530  100  98       Electric service 
SPX Corp.    000614  100  60 Natural resource 
Eaton Corp.    000710  100  83.8 Manufacturing 
SPX     000921  100  90.8     Manufacturing 
Southern Co Inc.   000926  100  80       Electric service 
MRV Communications Inc.  001109  100  92        Manufacturing 
Williams Cos Inc.   001203  100  65 Oil/Gas 
Titan Corp.     010315  100  84.0     Manufacturing 
Lucent Technologies   010327  100  63.3     Manufacturing 
Reuters Group    010517  100  87.0 Investment 
Lehman Brothers Merchant  010521  84.9  59.3      Natural resource 
Magna International Inc.  010731  100  80.0     Manufacturing 
Millipore     010809  100  80.1     Manufacturing 
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For the tracking stock sample, 22 announcements never materialized. Of the 
remaining 30, 4 were excluded for their foreign origin. Consequently, my tracking stock 
sample consists of 26 firms. Table 3 summarizes the dates of creation and industry 
classification of the parents engaged in tracking stocks.  
 
Table 3: 
Summary of Tracking Stocks Created for the Period of 1990 -2001 
 
Parent Corporation  Date  Industry of Parent (by two-digit SIC)  
 
USX    910507  Primary metal industries 
USX    920925  Primary metal industries 
Ralston-Purina   930802  Food and kindred products 
Pittston Company  930806  Coal mining 
Genzyme   941216  Chemicals and allied products 
CMS Energy   950721  Electric, gas, and sanitary services 
US West   951101  Communication  
Inco    960909  Metal mining 
Circuit City Stores  970204  Automative dealers and service stations 
Genzyme   981117  Chemicals and allied products 
Viacom    970423  Communication 
Georgia Pacific   971217  Lumber and wood products 
Sprint    981124  Industrial machinery and equipment 
AT&T    990310  Communication 
Perkin-Elmer   991026  Instruments and related products 
Ziff-Davis   990331  Printing and publishing 
Quantum   990804  Industry machinery and equipment 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 990526  Security and Commodity brokers 
Walt Disney   991118  Motion pictures 
Genzyme   990628  Chemicals and allied products 
AT&T    000427  Communication 
Andrx    000907  Chemicals and allied products 
Cablevision Systems  010330  Communication 
Apollo    000928  Diversified services 
World Com   010608  Communication 
Loews    020201  Insurance 
 
 
Table 4 reports the frequency of restructuring across years. Most of the tracking 
stocks in the sample were created in 1999, declined thereafter, while 1996 is the year in 
which most minority carve-outs occurred. 
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Table 4:  
The Number of Tracking Stocks and Minority Equity Carve-outs across the Period 
from 1991 to 2002 
 
 
Year   Tracking Stock  Minority carve-outs   
 
1991 1 3 
1992 1 4 
1993 2 7 
1994 1 5 
1995 2 2 
1996 2 9 
1997 2 4 
1998 2 4 
1999 7 4 
2000 3    8 
2001 2 7  
2002 1    0 
      
 
Total         26    57 
 
 
 
 
As one of the key hypotheses is to test whether managerial self-serving interests play 
a role in the restructuring decisions, I investigate the change in executive compensation after 
restructuring. I collected the managerial compensation data from proxy statements companies 
filed with SEC one year before the restructuring and one year after. Total compensation is in 
the form of cash compensation, stock awards, long-term investment pool (LTIP), stock 
options, as well as other annual compensations of the top five executives reported for each 
sample firm. The Long Term Investment Pool (LTIP) is a balanced fund consisting primarily 
of high-quality, readily marketable stocks and bonds. The primary purpose of the long-term 
investment pool is to promote managerial interests and the interests of shareholders by 
motivating key employees to work towards achieving long-range goals and by attracting and 
retaining exceptional employees. 
 21
The corporate governance variables such as insider holding and board composition 
are derived from the Compact Disclosure CD-ROM. I also extract the accounting and 
operating performance data from COMPUSTAT database and the stock trading data from 
CRSP for the period between 1990 and 2003.  
 
IV.2. Methodology 
IV.2.1 Logistic regression on restructuring choice 
Binomial logistic regressions of restructuring choice are run on managerial factors, 
liquidity measures, information asymmetry measures, synergy measures, and other motive 
measures. 




ROAMBINTINF
RELINSTINSRESTHETADELTACBSIZEcCH
111098
7654321   
Where 
 CH: Restructuring choice – the dummy is 1 if the restructuring is a creation of 
tracking stock, 0 if it is a carve-out; 
 BSIZE: Board size as a proxy for the board effectiveness; 
 THETA: The percentage change in compensation to stock price changes between T-1 
and T+1; 
 DELTAC: The percentage change in total compensation between T-1 and T+1; 
 RES: The percentage change in compensation from the restructured units relative to 
total compensation between T-1 and T+1; 
 INS: The percentage of insider ownership in the parent; 
 INST: The percentage of ownership held by institutions; 
 REL: Relatedness of the subsidiary to the parent; 
 INF:  Absolute value of earning forecast errors, divided by earning per share; 
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 INT: Interest coverage ratio as a proxy for liquidity; 
 MB: Market to book ratio; 
 ROA: Return on assets; 
  is the error term; 
 c, 1 - 11 are estimate parameters. 
  
THETA is the managerial alignment measure. Similar to that of Haushalter and 
Mikkelson (2000), the managerial incentives measure in this paper is the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to share price in terms of stock holdings and stock options scaled by total 
compensation. If compensation scheme in the form of stocks and stock options is effective, 
the interests of the managers can be better aligned with those of the shareholders, therefore 
leading to an improvement in performance. For presentation purpose, I use T0 to represents 
the year when the restructuring occurs, T-1 to represent one year before the restructuring year, 
and T+1 to represent one year after. 
 
OthersLTIPoptionsstock holdingsstock  on compensaticash 
optionsstock holdingsstock 


THETA  
 
Where 
∆ share holdings = the change in the value of share holdings between T-1 and T+1. 
∆ stock options = the change in the value of stock options between T-1 and T+1. 
Share holdings, stock options, cash compensation, LTIP and others represent the share 
holdings, stock options holdings, cash compensation, long-term investment pool and other 
compensation of the insiders at T-1 respectively.  
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Share holdings are measured in terms of dollar amount of shares distributed to the top 
five executive managers as part of the compensation. Stock options are measured in terms of 
present value determined using the Black Scholes Option Pricing Model at the time of grant.
 An alternative measure of managerial incentive, DELTAC, is the percentage change 
in total compensation of the executives including cash compensation, long-term investment 
pool, stocks, stock options and other compensation between T-1 and T+1.  
 
OthersLTIPoptionsstock holdingsstock  on compensaticash 
OthersLTIPoptionsstock holdingsstock oncompensaticash 


DELTAC  
 
Where 
∆ Cash compensation = the change in the value of cash compensation between T-1 and T+1.  
∆ LTIP= the change in the value of long-term investment pool between T-1 and T+1. 
∆ Others = the change in the value of other compensation between T-1 and T+1. 
RES is the measure of additional compensation from the restructured subsidiaries 
after restructuring and calculated as the percentage increase from the total compensation at  
T-1. 
  
OthersLTIPoptionsstock holdingsstock  on compensaticash 
 optionsstock  subsidiaryholdingsstock  subsidiary


RES  
Where  
holdingsstock  subsidiary and optionsstock  subsidiary are the change in the value 
of executive compensation in terms of stocks or stock options of the restructured subsidiary 
between T-1 and T+1.  
Other corporate governance factors considered in the study include insider holding, 
institutional holdings and board size. BSIZE, board size, is a proxy for the board 
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effectiveness, measured in the number of executives on the parent’s board of directors. INS, 
insider ownership, is the percentage ownership of all officers and directors of the parent. 
INST, institutional ownership, indicates the percentage ownership of the institutional 
investors. It can be also treated as an indirect information asymmetry measure, since a 
relatively large number of institutional investors can bring information to the market, 
therefore result in lower information asymmetry between the investors and managers. 
The proxy of liquidity motive of the firm to raise external capital through 
restructuring is INT, the interest coverage ratio. The lower the interest coverage ratio, the 
worse the liquidity and the more likely the firm would use initial public offering to raise 
funds.  
The synergy measure is the relatedness of the subsidiary to the parent, measured as 
the number of the first digits of four-digit SIC codes that are the same for the parent and 
subsidiary. If the four-digit SIC codes of the parent are exactly the same as those of the 
restructured unit, 4 is given. If first three SIC codes are the same, 3 is given, and vice versa. 
Similar to the information asymmetry measure in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), INF, is the absolute value of the difference between latest actual quarter earning per 
share and actual quarter average estimate, divided by the latest actual earnings per share. It is 
a measure of how accurately reported quarterly earnings were anticipated by investors, 
represented as a percentage of actual earnings. A larger percentage indicates higher level of 
information asymmetry between investors and managers. 
Profitability and efficiency of the parent before restructuring are also taken into 
account. Return on assets, ROA, is the profitability measure. Market to book ratio, MB, is the 
proxy for growth opportunities. In summary, the empirical proxies and the predicted 
relationship between the various firm motives and the restructuring choice are as follows in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5:  
The Hypothesized Relationship between Restructuring Choice and All Motives 
 
THETA is the percentage change in stock related compensation after restructuring; DELTAC is the absolute value change in 
compensation after restructuring; RES is the change in compensation resulted from the restructured subsidiaries after 
restructuring; INS is the insider holding; INST is the institutional holding; BSIZE is the board size; REL is the measure of 
relatedness; INT is the interest coverage ratio before tax; INF is the information asymmetry measure; MB is the price-to-
book ratio, the growth measure; and ROA is the return on assets.  
 
 
 Proxy          Predicted  Relationship 
 
 
Managerial Alignment THETA   THETAT ? THETAC8  
  
 DELTAC                       DELTACT? DELTACC9  
   
Managerial Entrenchment RES    REST > RESC  
 
 INS     INST < INSC  
   
 INST   INSTT<INSTC  
 
 BSIZE    BSIZET>BSIZEC  
 
Information Asymmetry INF    INFT < INFC  
 
Synergy REL    RELT > RELC  
 
Liquidity INT    INTT > INTC 
 
 
Growth Potential      MB    MBT < MBC  
 
Profitability ROA    ROAT> ROAC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 ? indicates no predetermined relationship for the percentage change in total stock compensation. 
 
9 ? indicates no predetermined relationship for the percentage change in total compensation. 
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IV.2.2 Multiple Regressions of Long-Term Performance  
IV.2.2.1. Stock performance 
To examine long-run stock performance after the restructuring, I calculate the buy-
and-hold return from purchasing shares at the closing price on the day of the restructuring to 
the end of the appropriate holding period. 
The buy-and-hold return is defined as: 
Buy-and-Hold Return =  
2
1
)]1([
T
T
itr  
Where 1T  is the date of the restructuring; 2T is the ending date of the holding period, 
one year, two years and three years respectively; and itr is the return for firm i on day t.  
Multiple regressions of long-term buy-and-hold stock performance of parents are run 
on managerial factors, liquidity measures, information asymmetry measures, synergy 
measures, and other profitability and growth measures. I investigate one-year, two-year and 
three-year buy-and-hold returns for both samples to find out what motives lead to the 
difference in their long-term stock performance. 




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7654321  
Where BHR is the buy-and-hold stock return. 
IV.2.2.2. Operating performance 
If the restructuring decision helps the parent firm better motivate the managers to 
increase productivity and achieve efficiency, then there should be an improvement in the 
firm’s operating performance. I test this hypothesis by regressing the changes in the operating 
performance three years following the restructuring on the above mentioned motives to see 
whether the change in operating performance is attributed to certain motives. 
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111098
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Where ∆ ROA is the change in return on assets at T+3 comparing to that of T0, a 
measure of operating efficiency. 
 
IV.2.3. Sample Decomposition 
I also examine whether similar results hold for each subgroup of firms that issue 
tracking stocks or carve-outs. Parent companies generally gain control of a subsidiary when 
the ownership percentage exceeds 50%. However, the financial statements of the parent and 
subsidiaries are consolidated for tax purposes when the parent owns over 80% of the 
ownership. Tax consolidation is a benefit if operating losses or tax credits which would 
otherwise be unused by either the parent or subsidiary can be used to offset taxable income of 
the more profitable unit, thereby reducing taxes to the consolidated entity. In this paper, the 
carve-out sample is further divided into the firms that own 80% or more ownership and those 
who own more than 50% but less than 80%.  
As indicated by Harper and Madura (2002), the way tracking stock is distributed can 
affect agency relationship, that is, whether distributed as a stock dividend to current 
stockholders, through a public offering, or as a currency of acquisition. Tracking stock via an 
initial public offering is very similar to carve-out and may have the tendency to create free 
cash flow and transfer wealth between current and new shareholders. If the tracking stock 
shares are undervalued, then wealth is transferred to tracking stockholders when the parent 
managers distribute cash equally, or vice versa. Therefore, I will also divide the tracking 
stock sample into two subgroups, the group comprising of tracking stocks issued through 
initial public offering and the group created by means other than initial public offering.  
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
V.1 Univariate Analysis  
Table 6 indicates the comparison of SIC classification of tracking stock and carve-out 
samples. The manufacturing sector is most popular for restructuring for both carve-outs and 
tracking stocks. The telecommunication sector ranks second (30%) with the tracking stock 
group, while the energy sector ranks second with the carve-out sample. 
 
Table 6: 
Tracking Stocks and Minority Carve-Outs by Industry 
 
Industry     Tracking Stock Sample Carve-out Sample 
 
Manufacturing: 
 
Food and Kindred Products    1   1 
Lumber and Wood     0   1 
Paper and Printing     2   0 
Chemical and Applied Products   3   4 
Petroleum Refining & Related   2   0  
Primary Metal Industries    1   1 
Industrial, Commercial Machinery   1   3 
Computer Equipment      
Electrical Equipment     0   2 
Transportation Equipment    0   3 
Meas Instrument, Photo, and Watches  1   7 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing industries  0     1 
       
Transportation Services:    1   0 
 
Tele Communication:     7   2 
 
Energy Sector: 
       2   7 
Wholesaling: 
Durable Goods     0   1 
Non-durable Goods     1   0 
General Merchandize Stores    0   2 
 
Retailing: 
Home, Furniture & Equipment Stores  2   1 
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Table 6: (Continued) 
Tracking Stocks and Minority Carve-Outs by Industry 
 
Industry     Tracking Stock Sample Carve-out Sample 
 
Financial Services: 
 
Depository Institutions    0   3 
Non-depository institutions    0   1 
Brokers      1   2 
Insurance Carriers     1   3 
Holding, and other Investment offices     1 
 
Entertainment & Services: 
0                     11 
 
Total        26   57 
 
 
Table 7 summarizes the description of the sample and reports the mean, median, mean 
difference and median difference between the tracking stock and carve-out groups. Since the 
sample size is small, the findings are interpreted based on the median comparison. The 
average asset size of the tracking stock and carve-out groups are approximately $21 million, 
$24 million respectively.  
The managerial incentive measure, Theta, indicates the sensitively of the top five 
executives’ wealth to share price scaled by the total compensation, including cash 
compensation, stock awards, long term investment pool, stock options, and other forms of 
compensation. The tracking stock sample has an average of 2.41, indicating that the 
compensation of the executives increased by 241% at T+1 compared to T-1. In comparison, the 
carve-out sample shows about 32% increase. The mean difference is significant at the 5% 
level. Similarly, the median incentive score for the tracking stock sample is 50%, and that of 
the carve-out group is 0. The median difference is also significant at the 5% level. These 
results clearly suggest that the magnitude of the increases in stock-related compensation is 
higher for the tracking group than that of the carve-out group. 
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Table 7:  
 
Descriptive Analysis of Variables of the Tracking Stock Sample and Carve-Out Sample 
 
TA is the total assets in thousand dollars; THETA is the percentage change in stock related compensation after restructuring; 
DELTAC is the percentage change in compensation after restructuring; RES is the change in compensation resulted from 
the restructured units after restructuring; INS is the insider holding; INST is the institutional holding; BSIZE is the board 
size; REL is the measure of relatedness; INT is the interest coverage ratio before tax; INF is the information asymmetry 
measure; MB is the price-to-book ratio, the growth measure; and ROA is the return on assets.  T-statistics of mean and 
median comparison are reported. ***, **, * represent the significant levels at 1 %, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
  Tracking Stock Sample Carve-Out Sample 
   N=26    N=57 
Variables Mean  Median Mean  Median t-Stat       t-Stat 
          Mean       Median 
 
TA  21,067  5,604  23,992  2,553  0.217      1.631 
          
Theta  2.41  0.50  0.32  0  -1.981        -3.922*** 
 
DeltaC  2.37  0.50  0.67  0.31  -1.661*        -0.332 
         
RES  0.14  0.04  0.01  0  -4.515***    -18.062*** 
            
INS  4.39  0.50  11.70  1.55  1.862*          1.013
           
INST  42.95  45.39  48.45  47.48  0.760           .605 
         
BSIZE   11.30  11.50  9.86  10.00  -1.463        -1.854 
           
RL  2.80  3.00  1.5  1.00  -3.728***    14.866*** 
           
INF  0.345  0.10  0.21  0.15  -1.308       0.488 
           
INT   7.81  6.65  3.38  2.78  -1.816*      -3.807* 
       
DEBT  23.63  20.75  31.07  24.59  1.327       0.782 
        
MB   3.45  2.83  2.36  1.99  -0.992        -3.264 
          
ROA   4.30  4.91  -3.61  2.02  1.067        4.964** 
          
 
DELTAC is the percentage change in total compensation at T+1 compared to T-1. The 
average increase in the total compensation for the tracking stock group is 136% while that of 
the carve-out sample is about 67%. The mean difference in DELTAC between the two groups 
is significant at the 10% level. However, the median percentage change in compensation after 
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the restructuring is 50.31% and 31.04% for the tracking stock group and the carve-out group 
respectively. The difference is not significant. Raltson-Purina and NTL in the tracking stock 
group have a significant increase in both THETA and DELTAC. 
In particular, RES, the measure of extra compensation from the restructured 
subsidiary shows a significant difference between the tracking stock and the carve-out groups 
at the 1% level. Tracking stock sample exhibits a 14% increase in compensation, compared to 
a 1% increase for the carve-out sample.  
Table 8 shows the extent of overlapping membership on the boards of parents and 
restructured units.  
 
Table 8:  
 
List of Firms with Extra Compensation from the Restructured Units 
 
Parent Company Name    Restructured Units   
 
Tracking Stock Sample: 
 
Genzyme      Genzyme Biosurgery 
       Genzyme Molecular Oncology  
US West      US West - Media 
       US West – Communications 
Pittston Company     Pittston - Burlington 
       Pittston - Brinks 
Sprint       Sprint - FON 
Perkin Elmer      Celera Genomics  
       PE Biosystems 
Ziff Davis      ZDNet 
Quantum      GMO 
Walt Disney      Go.com    
A T &T      AT & T Wireless 
 
 
Carve-out Sample: 
 
WMS Industries     Midway Games Inc. 
Commodore Environmental Services   Commodore Separation Technology 
American Software Inc    Logility Inc. 
Thermo Optek Corp     Thermo Vision 
Titan Corp      SureBeam Corp 
 
 32
 
For 35% of tracking stocks parents’ executives also sit on the board of tracking units 
and thus receive additional compensation from the units. On the other hand, only five out of 
fifty-seven firms have one or more directors on the board of the carved-out subsidiaries. 
Board composition is also considered in the corporate governance framework. The 
tracking stock firms have a larger board of an average of 12 executives than the equity carve-
out firms of 10. The board sizes of the carve-out group and tracking stock group, however, 
are not significantly different.  
The insider holdings of the parents reflect the strength of stock-related compensation 
in motivating the executives to maximize shareholders’ value. The average insider holding 
for the tracking stock sample is 4.39%, whereas that of the equity carve-out sample is 11.70%. 
The mean difference in insider holding between the tracking and the carve-out group is 
significant at the 10% level. Since firms that engaged in tracking stocks have lower insider 
holding, the interests of the insiders or officers might not be well aligned with those of the 
general shareholders. It is more likely that the executives of the tracking stock parents get 
into restructuring for their own benefits. The median institutional holdings for the tracking 
stock parent and the carve-out parent are 45% and 47% respectively. The difference is 
insignificant.  
Information asymmetry measure is the absolute value of forecast error between the 
actual latest quarter earning per share and the forecasted earning per share, divided by the 
actual latest quarter earning per share. The higher the INF, the higher is the information 
asymmetry. The average forecast error for the tracking stock group is 0.35, whereas that of 
the carve-out sample is 0.21. However, the median of the two groups is closer, with 0.10 for 
the tracking stock group and 0.15 for the carve-out group respectively. The median difference 
between the tracking and the carve-out group is insignificant.  
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I consider the restructured unit and the parent firm to be related when the four-digit 
SIC code of the unit overlaps with one of the parent’s four-digit SIC codes. The average 
value of REL for the tracking stock sample is 2.8 and the median is 3.0, compared to 1.5 and 
1.0 of the carve-out sample. Differences in both the mean and median between the two 
groups are significant at the 10% level.  This result is consistent with the empirical finding of 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000). 
In terms of liquidity, tracking stock sample reports a significantly higher mean 
interest coverage ratio than that of the carve-out group. The differences in both mean and 
median are significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis that 
one of the major motives why parents carve out units is to raise capital. I also check to see if 
the lower interest coverage ratio of the carve-out sample is a result of higher leverage. 
Although the median debt ratio of the carve-out sample is higher (24.59%) than that of the 
tracking stock group (20.75%), this result is not statistically significant.   
The carve-out group’s higher need for capital does not appear to stem from higher 
growth potential, but from poor profitability. Indeed, parents of tracking stocks show higher 
(although not statistically significant) price to book ratio than the carve-out group. In terms of 
operating performance (return on assets), however, the carve-out group underperforms the 
tracking stock sample at a statistically significant level.10 Taken together, these results imply 
that the major motive why parents create carve-out units is to raise capital. 
V.2. Logistic Regression of Restructuring Choice  
To investigate how managerial motives influence firms’ restructuring decision, I run 
logistic regressions on managerial incentive measures, extra compensation from the 
restructured units, insider holdings, institutional holdings, information asymmetry measure, 
relatedness measure, profitability measure and growth measure.  
                                                
10 The big difference between mean and median is mainly due to the few firms like Sepracor Inc, who had a 
return on assets of -44.787%. 
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As shown in Table 9, I test four different models. Because THETA is the percentage 
change in stocks related compensation and DELTAC is the percentage change in total 
compensation at T+1 compared T-1, they are not used in the same regression to avoid the 
problem of multicollinearity.  
Table 9:  
Logistic Regression on All Motives of Firms Choosing Tracking Stocks over Minority 
Equity Carve-outs 
 
The table shows 4 logistic regression models on managerial motives. Where 0 is given to the firms engaged in minority 
equity carve-out, and 1 is given to the firms engaged in tracking stocks. THETA is the percentage change in stock related 
compensation after restructuring; DELTAC is the percentage change in compensation after restructuring; RES is the change 
in compensation resulted from the restructured units after restructuring; INS is the insider holding; INST is the institutional 
holding; BSIZE is the board size; REL is the measure of relatedness; INT is the interest coverage ratio before tax; INF is the 
information asymmetry measure; MB is the price-to-book ratio, the growth measure; and ROA is the return on assets.  
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  **, * represent the significant levels at 5%, and 10% respectively. Sample size is 26 
for the tracking group, and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
 
Intercept   -0.213  -0.228  -0.257  -0.319   
 
THETA   0.219  0.192      
   (1.510)  (1.152)   
   
 
DELTAC      0.093  0.054   
       (0.598)  (0.314)    
 
RES   0.274*  0.284*  0.270*  0.294*    
   (2.089)  (1.868)  (1.877)  (1.734)    
  
REL   0.234*  0.291*  0.224  0.307*   
   (1.702)  (1.889)  (1.559)  (1.946)   
      
 
INT   0.330**  0.387*  0.359**  0.445*   
   (2.135)  (1.798)  (2.278)  (2.041) 
    
INF     0.204    0.179    
     (1.274)    (1.094)   
   
INST   -0.023    -0.058  -0.034 
   (-0.154)    (-0.383)  (-0.235) 
   
MB   0.037  0.050  0.067  0.106   
   (0.259)  (0.261)  (0.467)  (0.552)   
 
ROA   -0.094  -0.058  -0.104  -0.123   
   (-0.638)  (-0.247)  (-0.683)  (-0.511)    
 
INS   -0.074  -0.077  -0.064  -0.050 
   (-0.543)  (-0.471)  (-0.458)  (-0.301) 
 
BSIZE   0.113  0.046  0.157  0.096 
   (0.760)  (0.283)  (1.047)  (0.586) 
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I find RES, extra compensation from the restructured units, to be positively related to 
the restructuring choice. This relation is statistically significant. Holding other things the 
same, it is more likely that the firms that pay executives significantly higher extra 
compensation from the restructured unit after restructuring tend to choose tracking stock over 
carve-out as a restructuring vehicle. This might imply that executives expect to increase their 
extra compensation through tracking stocks. In addition, executives of a tracking stock’s 
parent are in a “no loss” situation. If the unit performs well, they reap the benefit and if it 
does not, then the unit is reverted back to the parent and the parent’s executives get to keep 
their original holdings. 11   
The extent of institutional and insider holdings might facilitate the self-serving 
behavior of tracking stock parents. The tracking stock parent has a lower insider holding 
(INS) than the parent of a carve-out unit, statistically significant at the 5% level. INST, the 
institutional holding, reflects the monitoring role of institutional investors. It is insignificantly 
negatively related to restructuring choice. A negative sign for this variable indicates that the 
parents with lower institutional ownership are more likely to choose tracking stocks over 
carve-out, thereby facilitating the self-interest motive of tracking stock parents.  
THETA, the measure of changes in stock compensation after restructuring, is 
insignificant in determining the restructuring choice. A positive sign for THETA indicates 
that the parents that increase the weight of stocks and stock options in the compensation 
package of the executives prefer tracking stock to carve-out as a restructuring choice. The 
coefficient of DELTAC, the measure of changes in total compensation at T+1 compared to T-
1, is positive, but not significant.  
                                                
11 When Staples decided to convert its tracking stock Staples.com, which was announced but never went public, 
into parent’s stocks, the critical shareholders perceive it as a sweetheart deal for stock-holding executives. Some 
shareholders even sued the company in Delaware chancery court. Finally, the directors of Staples voted on April 
3, 2001 to forgo personal profits on a stock buyback, after facing lawsuits and shareholder criticism. (Business 
Week, April 2001). 
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 INF, the information asymmetry measure, is not a significant factor determining the 
restructuring choice. However, the coefficient for REL is positive and significant at the 10% 
level. The result implies that the parents who are more related to the restructured subsidiaries 
are more likely to engage in tracking stocks than the counterparts. It is consistent with the 
parents’ incentives to maintain positive synergy with the tracking units.  
The coefficient for INT is positive and statistically significant. It is consistent with the 
proposition that the parents in poor liquidity position tend to choose carve-out, an initial 
public offering, to raise funds. The signs of proxy variables representing profitability, 
leverage, and growth are consistent with the results of univariate analyses. However, unlike 
in the case of univariate analyses, none of the coefficients is statistically significant.   
In summary, liquidity motive appears to be the primary motive for firms to engage in 
equity carve-out, significant in all four models. On the other hand, the firms that pay 
significantly higher compensation from the restructured units after the restructuring tend to 
choose tracking stocks over carve-outs. The parents with lower insider holdings prefer 
tracking stocks to carve-outs as a restructuring choice for their self-serving intention. 
Reduction of information asymmetry does not appear to be a major determinant of 
restructuring choice. 
 
V.3. Multiple Regressions of Long-Term Performance 
V.3.1. Stock performance 
Table 10 compares buy-and-hold stock returns of the parents who created tracking 
stocks with the same of parents who created carve-outs.  
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Table 10:  
 
A Comparison of the Buy and Hold Stock Performance and Operating Performance of 
Firms that Engaged in Tracking Stocks or Minority Equity Carve- Outs. 
 
The buy-and-hold return is defined as  
2
1
)]1([
T
T
itr , where 1T  is the date of the restructuring; 2T is the ending 
date of the holding period, one year, two years and three years respectively; and itr is the return for firm i on 
day t. T-statistics and significance level of median comparison are shown in parentheses. ** represents the significant level 
at 5%. Sample size is 26 for the tracking group, and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
 
  Tracking Stock Sample     Minority Equity Carve-outs  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median          t-statistics     t-statistics 
        Mean     Median 
                
Buy-and-Hold Return:  
 
One-year 0.005  0.021  -0.029  -0.045  0.243      0.324 
            
Two-year -0.113  0.083  0.055  0.091  -0.790      0.001 
          
Three-year -0.648  -0.160  0.287  -0.003             -2.069**   0.0620 
           
Operating Performance: 
 
Change in  -0.569  -0.575  -0.750  -0.074  1.119      1.645 
Return on           
Assets 
 
 
 
The return is computed for 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year after restructuring. The overall 
stock performance of tracking stock and carve-out samples is poor. The carve-out sample’s 
buy-and-hold return improves from a negative in 1-year after the restructuring to 5% after 
two years, and 29% after three years. The performance of the tracking stock sample, however, 
deteriorates from a positive 0.46% one year after the restructuring to -11.27% after two years, 
and –64.84% after three years. The deteriorating performance, however, cannot solely be 
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attributed to the restructuring decisions, as many of the tracking stocks that originated in 
1999 suffered a heavy set back. 12 
The average three-year buy-and-hold returns of the two groups are significantly 
different at the 5% level. Since the tracking stock and the carve-out samples are relatively 
small, the median difference may provide a better comparison of the two groups. The median 
difference of the tracking stock and the carve-out groups is not significant.  
 Table 11 compares the long-term stock performance and operating performance of the 
two subgroups of the carve-out sample-- one group owns over 80% of subsidiary unit, the 
other group owns between 50% and 80% of the unit. There is no significant difference in the 
long-term stock performance of return of the two subgroups. However, the operating 
performance of two groups differs significantly at the 1% level, with the ROA of the two 
groups being 11% and -37% respectively. The operating performance of the parents holding 
over 80% ownership of the carved-out subsidiaries improves significantly after restructuring 
than that of the group with an ownership between 50% and 80%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 The stock performance of a large number of firms who created tracking stocks in 1999 deteriorated. 
In particular, eight firms in the telecommunication industry suffered from the relatively low stock return. The 
minimum three-year buy-and-hold stock return of the tracking stock sample is -109.03% belong to AT&T. 
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Table 11:  
 
Stock and Operating Performance Comparison with Decomposition of Tracking Stock 
and Carve-out Samples 
 
T-statistics and significance level of median comparison are shown in parentheses. *** represents the significant level at 1%.  
Sample size is 26 for the tracking group, and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
Carve-out sample: Ownership   80%   Ownership < 80% 
 
Mean             Median  Mean         Median t-Stat t-Stat 
       Mean Median  
 
Buy-and-Hold Return: 
One-year  -0.0265  -0.0446  -0.0153      -0.0327 -0.067    -0.077 
           
Two-year  0.1156  -0.2832  -0.0058        0.0219 0.596     0.525 
             
Three-year  0.3023  0.2438  0.2705        -0.0443 0.104 0.201 
        
Change in  -1.117  0.110  -0.633      -0.370 0.397 7.738*** 
Return on assets                     
 
Tracking stock with IPO Equity Carve-out 
 
   Mean             Median  Mean         Median t-Stat t-Stat 
          Mean Median  
 
Buy-and-Hold Return  
 
One-year  -0.1935  -0.3470  -0.0289       -0.0446 -0.665  -0.669 
        
 
Two-year  -0.1933  -0.0360  0.0552        0.0912 -0.677     -0.108 
          
Three-year  -3.3684  0.0483  0.2874       -0.0032        -3.671***  0.071 
         
Change in   -1.044  -0.135  -0.879       -0.074 -0.085      -0.219 
return on assets           
 
 
  
V.3.2. Stock performance Related to Restructuring Motives 
To determine the effect of a restructuring motive on the stock performance, I relate 
the three-year buy-and-hold return to the motives of the firms that engaged in the 
restructuring as shown in Table 12.  
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Table 12:  
 
Multiple Regressions of Three-Year Long-Term Stock Performance on the Motives of 
Firms that Engaged in Tracking Stocks or Minority Equity Carve Outs 
 
Multiple regressions are run on the motives of engaging into the restructuring decisions. CROA represents the changes in 
return on assets. THETA is the percentage change in stock related compensation after restructuring; DELTAC is the 
percentage change in compensation after restructuring; RES is the change in compensation resulted from the restructured 
units after restructuring; INST is the institutional holding; REL is the measure of relatedness; INT is the interest coverage 
ratio before tax; INF is the information asymmetry measure; MB is the price-to-book ratio, the growth measure; and ROA is 
the return on assets. Figure in the parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent the significant levels at 1 %, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Sample size is 26 for the tracking group, and 57 for the carve-out group.  
 
     
Variables  Tracking Stocks           Minority Equity Carve-outs Sample 
 
Intercept  1.784  0.070   0.878  0.583 
 
THETA   1.981**     -0.049   
   (5.793)     (-0.347)     
 
DELTAC    0.579     -0.037 
     (4.255)     (-0.221) 
 
RES   -0.667*  -1.155*   0.258*  0.259 
   (-3.389)  (-6.769)   (1.878)  (1.624) 
 
REL   -0.680  0.569   -0.451*** -0.486*** 
   (-2.355)  (2.963)   (-3.176)  (-3.363) 
    
INF   0.445*     0.392**   
   (2.947)     (2.662)     
 
INT   1.110  -0.590   -0.093  -0.066 
   (1.734)  (-1.289)   (-0.423)  (-0.428) 
 
INST    0.262     0.260 
     (2.238)     (1.691) 
 
MB   -3.885*  -0.239   -0.342** -0.414*** 
   (-4.323)  (-0.522)   (-2.249)  (-2.873) 
   
ROA   1.578**  0.064   0.207  0.084 
   (5.081)  (0.337)   (0.884)  (0.496) 
 
 
 
For the tracking stock sample, RES, the extra compensation from the restructured unit, 
is significantly negatively related to the three-year average buy-and-hold return. In other 
words, the greater the additional compensation from the tracking divisions, the poorer the 
performance. It is consistent with the proposition that the parent’s managers create tracking 
stock unit as a means to receive additional compensation at the expense of shareholders. 
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Consequently, the expected benefit from incentive alignment does not materialize. Contrarily, 
carve-out parents whose executives are on the board of directors of both the parent and the 
restructured unit earn higher buy-and-hold returns than the group with no overlapping board 
membership. The difference is significant at the 10% level.   
THETA, the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock price changes after the 
restructuring decision, is positively related to the three-year buy-and-hold stock performance 
of the tracking stock parents and significant at the 5% level. Although not statistically 
significant, the relationship between DELTAC and performance is positive. In contrast, for 
the carve-out group, the relationship between both THETA and DELTAC on the one hand 
and long-term stock performance on the other is negative. Thus, increased compensation does 
not seem to result in improved performance of the carve-out parents. 
REL, the relatedness of the restructured unit to the parent, does not have a significant 
relation with the performance of the tracking stock parents. However, it is negatively related 
to the three-year buy-and-hold stock performance of the carve-out group and it is significant 
at the 1% level. In other words, the lower the relation of the unit with the parent, the better 
the performance of the parent firm. It suggests that the investors recognize the benefits of 
being focused by the parent firm.  
INF, the information asymmetry measure, is positively related to the long-term 
performance of both the tracking stock and the carve-out groups. The parent firms with 
higher information asymmetry before restructuring tend to have better long-term stock 
performance. This implies that the investors reward the reduction in information asymmetry 
via restructuring.  
Liquidity is not significantly to the performance of either group. Indeed, the relation, 
although statistically insignificant, is negative between the interest coverage ratio and the 
stock performance for the carve-out group. This implies that the poorer the liquidity of the 
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parent firm, the better the long-term performance for the carve-out parent. MB, the measure 
of firm’s growth potential, is negatively related to the long-term stock performance for the 
carve-out group and is significant at the 5% level. That is, the firms with high growth 
potentials appear to have low long-term stock performance three years after the restructuring. 
This can be understood that the firms with high growth potential needs financing support, 
restructuring though carve out provides the firms the option of getting funds. However, the 
funds provided by the initial public offering seem not enough to realize the growth potential 
in the long run. ROA, the measure of profitability, is positively related to stock performance 
for the tracking stock group and is significant at the 5% level. (in one model). A tracking 
stock parent with high profitability before restructuring tends to have higher long-term stock 
performance. 
In summary, for the parents of the tracking stock sample, the higher the executive 
compensation from the tracking units, the lower buy-and-hold return for parents. However, 
the relation is not statistically significant. The relatedness and growth potential are 
significantly negatively related to the long-term stock performance of the carve-out sample, 
indicating that the parents that carve out the less related units performed better in the long run. 
V.3.3. Operating Performance  
Table 13 compares the operating performance for the tracking stock and the carve-out 
groups. Both groups experience a decrease in return on assets three years after the 
restructuring as shown in Table 10. The mean decrease in return on assets is 56.9% for 
tracking stock parents and 75% for the carve-out parents. The median decreases in return on 
assets for the two groups are large as well 57.5% for tracking stock parents and 7.4% for the 
carve-out parents.  However, neither is statistically significant. 
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Table 13:  
 
A Comparison of the Changes in Operating Performance of Firms that Engaged in 
Tracking Stocks or Minority Equity Carve Outs 
 
Multiple regressions are run on the motives of engaging into the restructuring decisions. CROA represents the 
changes in return on assets. THETA is the percentage change in stock related compensation after restructuring; DELTAC 
is the percentage change in compensation after restructuring; RES is the change in compensation resulted from the 
restructured units after restructuring; INST is the institutional holding; REL is the measure of relatedness; INT is the interest 
coverage ratio before tax; INF is the information asymmetry measure; MB is the price-to-book ratio, the growth measure; 
and ROA is the return on assets. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  ** represents the significant level at 5%. Sample size 
is 26 for the tracking group, and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
    
Variables  Tracking Stocks           Minority Equity Carve-outs  
 
Intercept  -0.671  -1.079   0.515  0.367  
  
THETA     -2.053     -0.020 
     (-1.798)     (-0.093) 
 
DELTAC  -1.534     -0.137    
   (-1.517)     (-0.552)    
       
RES   -0.140  -0.062   -0.009  -0.061  
   (-0.149)  (-0.069)   (-0.039)  (-0.303)   
 
REL   0.456  0.752   -0.465** -0.471** 
   (0.370)  (0.628)   (-2.196)  (-2.214)   
 
INT   -0.593  -1.053   0.017  0.045  
   (-0.265)  (-0.492)   (0.058)  (0.153)  
  
INF   -0.261  -0.266   0.160  0.157  
   (-0.581)  (-0.654)   (0.751)  (0.729)   
   
MB   2.699  3.923   -0.069  -0.027  
   (0.824)  (1.151)   (-0.239)  (-0.090)  
  
ROA   -1.218  -1.403   -0.068  -0.103 
   (-1.505)  (-1.824)   (-0.181)  (0.270) 
    
 
 
V.3.4. Operating Performance Related to Restructuring Motives 
To investigate whether the change in operating performance is related to restructuring 
motives, I regress the change in return on assets on the various motives. Using THETA and 
DELTAC one at a time in the equations, I find none of the motives has significant 
relationship with the performance of the tracking stock group. However, relatedness is 
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negatively related to the operating performance of the carve-out group and this relation is 
significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the less closely related the unit is to the parent, 
the better the operating performance for the parent.  To divest a subsidiary through equity 
carve-out with which the parent has low positive synergy can help the parent remain focused 
and at the same time bring funds for investment.  
 RES, the extra compensation from the restructured unit, is negatively related to the 
change in return on assets for both the tracking stocks and the carve-out groups. However, in 
neither case, the relation is statistically significant. This suggests that the higher the 
additional compensation the parent receive from the restructured unit, the poorer the 
operating performance for the parent. 
 THETA and DELTAC, the compensation incentive measures, are negatively related 
to the change in return on assets for both groups. Though the relationship is not significant, 
the result implies that increased compensation does not entail improved operating 
performance. Information asymmetry measure is negatively related to operating performance 
of the tracking group, but the relation is not significant.  In contrast, the relation is positive, 
although insignificant, for the carve-out group.  
The relation between interest coverage ratio and operating performance is opposite for 
the two groups. For the carve-out group, the relation is positive, while the same for the 
tracking stock parents.  The negative relationship exists between pre-restructuring and post-
restructuring ROAs for parents of both groups. Although the relation is insignificant, it 
suggests that parent firms with lower pre-restructuring ROA show more improvement in the 
post-restructuring ROA. The relation between market to book ratio and operating 
performance is opposite for the two groups—negative for carve-out parents and positive for 
the tracking stock parents. Although not statistically significant, the opposite results suggest 
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that carve-out parents with higher growth potential did not improve, while the opposite holds 
true for the tracking stock group.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Empirical evidence supports the proposition that the factor that motivates the firm to 
choose tracking stock over minority equity carve-out is that tracking stock structure provides 
the executives a means of earning additional compensation from stocks and stock options of 
the tracking units. The control mechanism of the tracking stock structure with the same board 
of directors serving on the parent and the subsidiary creates conflicts of interests and causes 
the long-term buy-and-hold stock performance to be significantly lower than that of the 
carve-out group. Use of tracking stocks to align managers’ interests and reduce information 
asymmetry does not appear to be related to post-restructuring operating and stock 
performance. The primary motivation of engaging in equity carve-outs is to raise capital. The 
parent receives better stock returns when the restructured unit is less related to parent’s 
business.  
Regarding the operating performance, parents of both the carve-out and tracking stock 
group experience a decrease in return on assets three years after the restructuring. However, 
when a parent carves out less related unit, it outperforms the parent that carves out a more 
related unit.  
In conclusion, the fact that the executives weigh self-interests over the shareholders’ 
interests in the tracking stock structure may explain why executives prefer tracking stocks to 
equity carve outs.  This may explain why in spite of increased incentive alignment the parents 
of stock exhibit poor long-term stock performance. The financing motives and desire to 
remain focused motivate the parent to engage in equity carve out. It is value enhancing if the 
parent firms carve out less related subsidiaries.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IS OVERREACTION AN EXPLANATION FOR THE VALUE EFFECT? A STUDY 
USING IMPLIED VOLATILITY FROM OPTION PRICES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many empirical studies indicate that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the 
long-term, either measured by total return or risk-adjusted return (e.g., Fama and French. 
(1992, 1996); Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994); Bauman and Miller, (1997)). The 
explanations for the value stock effect however are not clear. Efficient market arguments (e.g., 
Fama and French, (1992)) suggest that firms with a low price-to-book ratio may be riskier 
and as a result command a higher risk premium. On the other hand, the rationale behind value 
investing is that investors overreact to lack of growth opportunities for value stocks and/or 
they overreact to growth prospects for growth stocks (e.g., Graham (1962)); consequently, 
value stocks may be under-priced while growth stocks are over-priced. The issue has 
important implications for individual investors as well as institutional ones. For instance, 
Morningstar classifies mutual funds’ investment styles into value or growth oriented. By 
using the methodology first proposed by Stein (1989), this study contributes to the existing 
literature on the overreaction explanation for the price-to-book effect. 
Stein (1989) analyzes the term structure of options’ implied volatility to infer the 
degree of investor overreaction. Intuitively, if stock prices have a tendency to return to their 
long-term mean, long-term investors revise their expectations for future volatility to a smaller 
extent than their short-term counterparts do. The expectation for future volatility can be 
inferred from option prices, commonly referred to as implied volatility. Therefore, implied 
volatility is the current consensus of anticipated future volatility by market participants, and it 
 48
reflects the market sentiment for the underlying security. Stein’s (1989) empirical results 
using S&P 100 index options show that implied volatility for long-term options moves almost 
in lockstep with short-term options, thereby suggesting overreactions. However, Diz and 
Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) show that the degree of overreaction 
is sensitive to statistical specifications and assumptions about the underlying stock return 
generating process.  
This paper applies Stein’s (1989) mean reversion model and Heynen, Kemna, and 
Vorst’s (1994) GARCH and EGARCH methods to investigate whether the degree of 
overreaction differs between value and growth stocks. To the author’s knowledge, there is no 
similar research on this issue. One study that is somewhat related is the one by La Porta, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). They examine stock price reactions to earning 
announcements and conclude that a significant portion (roughly one third of the first two 
years) of the difference in return between value stock and growth stock is explained by more 
systematically positive earning surprises for value stocks. Bauman and Miller (1997) 
document similar findings. However, none of these studies directly infers investors’ 
expectations. 
A finding of overreaction for either value stocks or growth stocks could lend support 
to overreaction as an explanation for the value stock effect. Absence of overreaction could be 
interpreted as evidence that investors in various types of stocks are not fundamentally 
different, which is plausible considering that institutional investors hold a large portion of 
shares and are fairly diversified. The focus here is whether the degree of overreaction differs 
between value and growth stocks. The problems as indicated by Diz and Finucane (1993) and 
Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) would have little effect on the results, unless measurement 
problems are more severe for a particular group of stocks. Moreover, this study estimates 
implied volatility for individual stocks formed by two different criteria, as opposed to 
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previous studies that use index options, allowing for a richer set of testing. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the growth investors largely overreact to a larger degree than the value 
investors, offering support to overreaction as an explanation to the value effect. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 illustrates the theoretical framework for each model and states 
the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. The last section concludes. 
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II. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
II. 1 Value Stock Effect 
Fama and French, (1992, 1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994) and 
Bauman and Miller (1997) document that value stocks produce higher returns than growth 
stocks in the U.S. stock market. Recently Beneda (2002) examines the performance of growth 
versus value stock portfolios created during the period 1983-1987. Consistent with prior 
studies, the five-year returns of value stocks exceed those of growth stocks. However, the 
long-term buy-and-hold returns (up to 18 years) of growth stocks are higher than those of 
value stocks for portfolios created during the years included in the study. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that, after a five-year run-up, some value stocks would be classified as growth stocks. 
Furthermore, her time period mainly covers 1990s, a period when growth stocks perform 
exceptionally well. The stock returns are not adjusted for market returns as well. 
In addition to the considerable empirical research for the U.S. stock market, some 
studies compare the performances of value and growth stocks in the stock markets in other 
countries. Value and growth stocks may perform differently in non-U.S. markets because of 
the variations in investors’ behavior and/or market conditions. For example, Bauman (1996) 
observes that the availability, quality, and timeliness of research information vary 
substantially from one country to another. Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993), using price-
to-book ratios, find that value stocks outperformed growth stocks in France, Germany, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom in the 1981-1992 period. Fama and French (1998) conclude that 
value stocks tend to have higher returns than growth stocks in 12 of 13 major markets during 
1975-1995 period and the difference between average returns on global portfolios of high and 
low book-to-market stocks is 7.6% per year. 
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Researchers have offered two primary explanations for the performance difference. 
Fama and French (1992, 1996) suggest that price-to-book and firm size may proxy for risk. 
Thus the fact that value stocks might be considerably riskier than growth stocks account for 
their superior return. However, Fama and French (1992) find evidence to the contrary - stocks 
with low price-to-book value ratios are characterized by lower betas. If beta represents the 
systematic risk of a stock, value stocks with low price-to-book ratios are supposed to have 
higher beta than growth stocks.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that investors erroneously extrapolate 
past earnings growth too far into the future and therefore cause stock prices to deviate from 
their 'fundamental' value.  Future earnings of firms that recently performed badly - more 
likely to be relatively small and have a high book-to-market ratio - are underestimated, 
whereas growth stocks or large stocks are overestimated. Based on the stock price reactions 
around earnings announcement for value and growth stocks over a five-year period after 
portfolio formation, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that a significant 
portion of return difference between value and growth stocks is attributable to earnings 
surprises that are systematically more positive for value stock, which is inconsistent with a 
risk-based explanation for the return differential. Instead, they argue that value stocks have 
been under-priced relative to their risk and return characteristics. Bauman and Miller (1997) 
enhance the argument by showing that investment research analysts systematically 
overestimate the future earning per share of growth stocks relative to value stocks; as a result, 
growth stocks experience lower returns subsequently when realized earning per share growth 
rates are disappointingly lower than those that were expected.13 
 The greater information asymmetry inherited in growth stocks can make growth 
stocks sensitive to changes in investor sentiment. Copeland and Copeland (1999) suggest an 
                                                
13 Bauman and Miller (1997) observe that the EPS growth rate has a mean-reversion tendency, over 
time, in which the high growth rates associated with growth stocks subsequently tend to decline 
whereas the low growth rates associated with value stocks tend to increase.  
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investing strategy that involves switching between value stocks and growth stocks. When the 
estimate of expected future volatility goes up, the rising uncertainty about the future might 
lead to falling confidence in growth stocks and investors shift into value stocks. When the 
estimated future volatility goes down, investors are likely to shift into growth stocks on the 
assumption that decreases in expected volatility signal rising confidence in the future, a 
condition that favors growth stocks. They find evidence supporting the effectiveness of the 
strategy. 
 
II. 2 Term Structure of Implied Volatility 
 Stein (1989) examines the term structure of implied volatilities, using two daily time 
series on implied volatilities for S&P 100 index options over the period from December 1983 
to September 1987. Based on the assumption that the volatility follows a mean reverting 
process with a constant long-run mean and a constant coefficient of mean reversion, changes 
in long-term implied volatility should be less than those of short-term. Instead, he finds that 
implied volatility of long-term and short-term options move almost in perfect lockstep. The 
correlation between long-term and short-term implied volatility is close to one. Therefore, he 
concludes that this presents evidence for overreaction. 
Nevertheless, Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) 
question the evidence of overreaction. Diz and Finucane (1993) indicate that the relation 
between long and short options cannot be constant. They use changes in implied volatility as 
opposed to the level of implied volatility and find no evidence for overreactions for S&P 100 
stock index. Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) utilize one year’s data on the European 
Option Exchange and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They test restrictions on implied 
volatilities under mean reverting model, GARCH model and EGARCH model and find that 
their conclusion about overreaction depends on the model specifying the process of price 
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volatility. EGARCH model gives the best description of asset prices and the term structure of 
options’ implied volatilities and indicates no overreaction. On the other hand, assuming mean 
reverting and GARCH models, the evidence is in favor of overreaction. Nevertheless, they 
find that none of the models is misspecified, as a result they cannot reach defined conclusions 
on whether investors overreact to information. Poteshman (2001) examines whether the long-
horizon overreaction documented by Stein (1989) in the OEX market is present in the S&P 
500 (SPX) index options market in a later period. Employing a standard variance model, he 
separates daily changes in instantaneous variance into expected and unexpected parts and 
assumes investors respond to the unexpected part when they set option prices. The evidence 
indicates that SPX options market investors underreact to daily information and overreact to 
extended periods of mostly similar daily information and exhibit increasing misreaction to 
daily information as a function of the quantity of previous similar information. 
 In summary, the empirical results on the term structure of implied volatility of options 
are mixed and the underlying reasons for the different performance between growth stock and 
value stocks remain an open question. 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Stein (1989) assumes that instantaneous volatility σt evolves according to continuous-
time mean reverting AR1 process as follows. 
(Equation 1)  
dzdtd ttt   )(   
   
At time t, the expectation of volatility as of time t+j is given by 
(Equation 2)  
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Where  is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of short-term stock options at 
a one-day lag. 1  e . That is, volatility is expected to decay geometrically back 
towards its long-run mean level of  .  
Denoted by Vt(T), the implied volatility at time t on an option with T remaining until 
expiration should equal to the averaged expected instantaneous volatility over the time span 
[t, t+T]. Using Equation 1, this implies 
(Equation 3) 
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Suppose there are two options of different terms to maturity: a short-term option with 
time to expiration T and implied volatility )(TV St , and a long-term option with time to 
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expiration K, which is n days longer than T (K=T+n) and implied volatility )(KV Lt , the 
following relationship is expected to hold. 
(Equation 4) 
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 represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long-term stock 
options with respect to that of the short-term option. Given a movement in the implied 
volatility of short-term option StV , there should be a smaller movement in the implied 
volatility of long-term option LtV . The exact proportion depends on the mean reversion 
parameter ρ, as well as on the times to expiration of the two options. 
However, empirical evidence in recent studies indicates that the assumption of 
constant conditional means and variances for stock returns is unrealistic (Poterba and 
Summers, 1986). Bollerslev’s (1986) Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model and Nelson’s (1991) Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) 
model are widely used to describe the stock price dynamics. Further research indicates 
GARCH model is very useful in modeling the relationship between a stock’s expected return 
and risk. In the case of a GARCH (1,2) specification, stock return and stock return volatility 
are modeled as follows, 
  Equation (5) 
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Equation (6) 
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Where tR is the daily stock return, t is the stock return volatility, r is the risk-free rate, 
λis the unit risk premium, 210  and ,,  are independent parameters, and t  is Gaussian 
white noise. From Equation (6), one can observe that the conditional stock volatility is a 
function of the volatility of one period earlier and the shock during that period. Thus, the 
model allows for clustering of periods with high volatility and periods with low volatility. 
The relationship between expected volatilities differing in time to maturity derived by 
Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) is as follows, 
Equation (7) 
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 is the unconditional volatility. The Theoretical theta  therefore depends on the 
independent parameters 210  and ,,  . 
Another description of stock return given by Nelson (1991) is the EGARCH (1,1) 
specification. Stock return and stock return volatility are modeled as follows, 
 Equation (8) 
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Where tR is the daily stock return, t is the stock return volatility, 3210  and , ,,   
are independent parameters, and t  is Gaussian white noise.  
Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) test the term structure of implied volatilities as 
follows, 
Equation (9) 
)(*),()( 22  LnLnVTLnLnV St
L
t   
Where 
Equation (10) 
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 , the unconditional volatility, is a function of parameters of the model as below. 
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 Equation (14)  
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In summary, the main difference among Equation (4), (7) and (9) on the term 
structure of implied volatility is the level of unconditional volatility and the different 
parameters for the three specifications. Therefore, the theoretical value of theta, the elasticity 
of long-term implied volatility in response to the change in short-term implied volatility, 
varies according to the different parameter estimates. The theoretical theta can be generalized 
as a function of parameter p, and time to maturity T as follows. 
 Equation (15) 
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Where 
p = ρ, the autocorrelation coefficient assuming that the implied volatility is mean 
reverting. 
p = γ, a function of parameter estimates from the GARCH and the EGARCH 
specifications for the stock return. 
In this paper, the mean reversion, GARCH and EGARCH models are applied to test 
the term structure of implied volatility. For each model specification, I test the hypothesis that 
the long-term implied volatility is formed rationally based on the theoretical theta, the 
elasticity of long-term options in respect to short-term options. In particular, I test whether 
the average variation of implied volatility of the growth stock options over time is higher than 
that of the value stock options, demonstrating a greater degree of overreaction.  
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Daily option data from July 2000 to December 2002 provided by Prophet Financial 
System, a relatively comprehensive database after Berkley Options database became 
unavailable, are used for the study. The dataset include open price, close price, high and low 
prices, trading volume and open interests for call and put contracts of stock options. Daily 
stock price, stock return, interest rates, and accounting data are extracted from CRSP and 
Compustat.  
I restrict the sample to stocks within S&P 100 index to ensure relatively active trading 
of each stock and a continuous time-series of implied volatility for analysis. A continuous 
time series of implied volatility is critical to calculate , the autocorrelation coefficient of the 
implied volatility of short-term option series, an input for the latter computation of theoretical 
theta. The theoretical theta will not be reliable if  is found from a discontinuous time series. 
In addition, without active trading in a stock option, the implied volatility would be constant, 
which is against the objective of the study, to compare the degree of changes in implied 
volatility between value and growth stocks. S&P 100 stocks meet the criterion of the study 
since they are widely traded and comprise of stocks with various growth aspects. In the case 
of any possible non-trading days for certain sample stocks, I use linear interpolation method 
to replace the missing values to ensure a continuous time series before building the equally-
weighted and the value-weighted implied volatility series of value and growth portfolios.  
The finance literature generally classifies value stocks and growth stocks according to 
the earning yield and book-to-market value ratios. Typically, value stocks are those whose 
market price is relatively low in relation to earnings per share (Basu 1977), cash flow per 
share (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994), book value per share (Fama and French 
1992), and dividends per share (Blume 1980 and Rozeff 1984). In comparison, growth stocks 
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have been defined as having relatively high prices in relation to those same fundamental 
factors, as well as high past rates of growth in earning per share.  
However, there was no one variable that appeared to be better than the others in 
identifying value stocks that outperformed the market.  In Lakonishok, Schleifer, and 
Vishny’s (1994) study, price-to-cash flow appears to be an indicator of value that leads to 
more significant mean difference than price-to-earning or price-to-book value. In Bauman, 
Conover and Miller’s (1998) study, price-to-book value rather than price-to-earning, price-to-
cash flow, or dividend yield is the indicator of value that reports a more significant mean 
difference. Fama and French (1998) classify value and growth portfolios formed on four 
measures, book-to-market (B/M), earning to price (E/P), cash flow to price (C/P) and 
dividend to price ratios (D/P) respectively. The value portfolio includes firms whose B/M, 
E/P, C/P or D/P are among the highest 30% for a country, and growth firms include firms in 
the bottom 30%. In this paper, I rank the S&P 100 stocks by both price-to-book ratio and 
price-to-earning ratio. The top 30% is classified as growth portfolio, and the bottom 30% falls 
into value portfolio. The remaining 40% are eliminated. 
The initial dataset of S&P 100 contains about ten million records over the sample 
period from 2000 to 2002. Eliminating 40% of the initial set, that is neither growth nor value 
stock, we end up with six million observations. Since there might be multiple option contracts 
with different strike prices matured on the same day and not all of them contain active trading 
records, I screen the dataset and retain one near-the-money option contract with a relatively 
large number of observations for each sample stock each month and build continuous short-
term and long-term series.  The screening criterion is to retain the contracts with the least 
number of observations with the same open price, close price, high price, and low price. This 
enables retaining contracts with active trading for the calculation of implied volatility. 
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For estimating implied volatility, I use the Binomial Option Pricing model by Cox, 
Ross and Rubinstein (1979). It explicitly accounts for the discrete dividend on the stock 
option and for the possibility of early exercise to calculate the implied volatility. After 
deriving the implied volatility of individual stock, I create two time series for both the value 
and the growth portfolios. The short-term series consists of observations with one day up to 
one month to expiration. The long-term series consists of observations with thirty-one days 
up to two months to expiration.   
Moreover, for each time series implied volatility is calculated by averaging the 
implied volatility of call and put contracts near the money. Then I build the equally-weighted 
and the value-weighted implied volatility of value or growth portfolios by multiplying the 
implied volatility of each stock in value or growth portfolios by its weight on each day. 
Eventually I have 626 daily observations for each series from July 2000 to December 2002 
for analysis.  
To obtain the empirical theta from the implied volatility series, I run OLS regressions 
of LtV  against 
S
tV for each portfolio. The coefficient of 
S
tV  indicates the actual elasticity of 
long-term options in respect to short-term options. If the empirical theta is greater than the 
theoretical theta, then the long-term contracts overreact to the short-term contracts. If the 
difference between empirical theta and theoretical theta is greater for growth portfolio than 
for value portfolio, then there is a greater degree of overreaction in growth portfolio than in 
value portfolio, or vice versa. 
Since the theoretical theta is a function of parameters under different specifications of 
stock returns, I estimate the autocorrelation coefficients and GARCH and EGARCH 
parameters using portfolio return for both the equally-weighted and the value-weighted 
portfolios. Then empirical theta is compared with theoretical theta and T tests are conducted 
to check for the significant difference between the two. Finally, I draw conclusion based on 
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the comparison of T-values of the growth and the value portfolios as to whether there is 
support for the overreaction as an explanation for the value effect.  
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
V. 1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 14 and Table 15 list the firms in the value and growth portfolios formed by 
price-to-book and price-to-earning ratios. Each portfolio consists of 30 firms.   
Table 14:   
 
List of Value and Growth Portfolios Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio for the Sample 
Period from 2000 to 2002. 
 
Company Name  Ticker  Company Name     Ticker 
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio 
 
American Int’l Group Inc. AIG  Alcoa Inc.    AA 
Amgen Inc   AMGN American Electric Power  AEP 
American Express  AXP  AVON Products   AVP 
Boeing Co.   BA  Bank of America Corp  BAC 
Baxter International Inc. BAX  Brunswick Corp   BC 
Bristol Myers Squibb  BMY  Boise Cascade Corp   BCC 
Colgate-Palmolive Co. CL  Burlington Northern Santa Fe  BNI 
Campbell Soup Co.  CPB  Delta Airlines    DAL 
CISCO Systems Inc.  CSCO  Disney     DIS 
General Electric Co.  GE  Entergy Corp    ETR 
Home Depot Inc.  HD  Fedex Corp    FDX 
Int’l Business Machines Corp IBM  General Motors Corp   GM 
Intel Corp   INTC  International Paper Co.  IP 
Johnson & Johnson  JNJ  J P Morgan Chase & Co.  JPM 
Coca-Cola Co.  KO  Lucent Technologies   LU 
McDonalds Corp  MCD  Merrill Lynch & Co.   MER 
3M Co.   MMM  Norfolk Southern Co.   NSC 
Altria Group Inc.  MO  National Semiconductor Co.  NSM 
Merck & Co.   MRK  Bank One    ONE 
Microsoft Corp  MSFT  Occidential Petroleum Co.  OXY 
Nortel Networks Corp NT  Raytheon Co.    RTN 
Oracle Corp   ORCL  Sears Roebuck & Co.   S 
PepsiCo Inc.   PEP  Southern Co.    SO 
Procter & Gamble Co. PG  AT&T Corp    T 
Radioshack Corp  RSH  Tektronix Inc.     TEK 
Sara Lee Corp   SLE  Toys R US    TOY 
Texas Instruments Inc. TXN  Unisys Corp    UIS 
United Technologies Corp UTX  Williams Co.    WMB 
Wal-mart Stores  WMT  Weyerhaeuser Co.   WY 
Exxon Mobil Corp  XOM  Xerox Corp    XRX 
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Table 15:   
 
List of Value and Growth Portfolios Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio for the 
Sample Period from 2000 to 2002. 
 
Company Name   Ticker  Company Name     Ticker 
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio 
 
Bank of America Corp  BAC  American International Group AIG 
Brunswick Corp   BC  Amgen Inc.      AMGN 
Boise Cascade Corp   BCC  Avon Products  AVP 
Black & Decker Corp   BDK  Baxter International Inc. BAX 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp BNI  Baker-Hughes Inc.  BHI 
Eastman Kodak Co.   EK  Bristol Myers Squibb  BMY 
Entergy Corp    ETR  Ceridian Corp   CEN 
Ford Motor Co.   F  Colgate-Palmolive Co. CL 
General Motors Corp   GM  CISCO Systems Inc.   CSCO 
HCA Inc.    HCA   Delta Airlines Inc.   DAL 
Harrahs Entertainment Inc  HET  DU PONT (E I) De Nemours DD 
Int’l Flavors & Fragrances   IFF  Disney (Walt) Co.  DIS 
J P Morgan Chase & Co.  JPM  General Electric Co.  GE 
Kmart Holding Corp   KMRT  Halliburton Co.  HAL 
Limited Brands Inc   LTD  HCA Inc.   HCA 
Lucent Technologies Inc.  LU   Home Depot Inc  HD 
May Department Stores Co.  MAY  Johnson & Johnson  JNJ 
Massey Energy Co.   MEE  Coca-Cola Co.  KO 
Merrill Lynch & Co.   MER  Lucent technologies Inc. LU 
Microsoft Corp   MSFT   Merck & Co.   MRK 
Altria Group Inc.   MO  Bank One Corp  ONE 
National Semiconductor Corp NSM  PepsiCo Inc.   PEP 
Nortel Networks Corp  NT  Procter & Gamble Co. PG 
Occidental Petroleum Corp  OXY  Raytheon Co.   RTN 
Sears Roebuck & Co.   S  Schlumberger Ltd.  SLB 
AT&T Corp    T  Tektronix Inc.   TEK 
Toys R US Inc   TOY  Texas Instruments Inc. TXN 
Unisys Corp    UIS  Williams Cos Inc.  WMB 
Verizon Communications  VZ  Wal-Mart Stores  WMT 
Weyerhaeuser Co.   WY  Xerox Corp   XRX 
            
            
    
 
Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics of the annual buy-and-hold stock returns of 
growth and value portfolios classified by price-to-book and price-to-earning.  
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Table 16:  
 
Descriptive Analysis of the Annual Buy-and-Hold Stock Return of Value and Growth 
Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
(E) represents the summary of equally-weighted series, and (V) represents the summary of value-weighted 
series. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Sample Period Growth Portfolio    Value Portfolio 
 
Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio 
 
  (E)   (V)   (E)   (V) 
 
Whole Period   
-0.2978  -0.4411  -0.1402  -0.2214
   
2000      
0.0259   -0.0124  -0.0412  -0.0582 
 
2001     
  -0.1804  -0.2013  0.0511   0.0526 
 
2002   
  -0.1516  -0.1537  -0.1368  -0.1486 
 
 
Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio 
 
  (E)   (V)   (E)   (V) 
 
Whole Period   
  -0.3006  -0.4558  -0.2220  -0.4392
   
2000   
  0.0076   -0.0592  -0.1001  -0.2659 
 
2001   
  -0.1493  -0.1756  0.0346   -0.0593 
 
2002   
  -0.1904  -0.2774  -0.1601  -0.1979 
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Overall, the buy-and-hold return of value stocks is higher than that of growth stocks 
for both the equally weighted and the value-weighted portfolios over the sample period from 
2000 to 2002, even though both portfolios report negative returns.  There is evidence of value 
effects.   
For the portfolios formed by price-to-book ratio, the buy-and-hold return of equally-
weighted value and growth portfolios is -0.2978 and -0.1402, respectively. With growth 
portfolio earning an annual return of 0.0259 in 2000, the beginning of a market decline, value 
portfolio provides -0.0124. However, in the later periods 2001 and 2002 the value stocks 
outperform growth stocks. In particular, the value portfolio has a buy-and-hold return of 
0.0511 in 2001 whereas the growth portfolio reports a return of -0.1804. For the value-
weighted portfolios, value portfolios consistently show a higher buy-and-hold return than the 
growth portfolios, even though the return of both is negative for the whole sample period 
from 2000 to 2002. Decomposing the sample by year, I find out that the value portfolio 
outperforms growth portfolio in 2001 and 2002, while the reverse holds true for 2000. 
For the portfolios classified by price-to-earning ratio, the value portfolio outperforms 
the growth portfolio over the whole sample period from 2000 to 2002. The difference in buy-
and-hold return between growth portfolio and value portfolio is larger for the equally-
weighted portfolios than for the value-weighted.  While the equally-weighted growth 
portfolio reports a buy-and-hold return of -0.3006, the value portfolio reports -0.2220.  
Similar to the case of portfolios based on price-to-book ratio, the growth portfolio 
outperforms the value portfolio in 2000, and the reverse holds for 2001 and 2002.  
Table 17 shows the descriptive analysis of the short-term and long-term series of 
value and growth portfolios for the whole sample period from 2000 to 2002 and for each 
year.  
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Table 17:  
 
Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short-term and Long-term Option 
Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
(S) represents the summary of short-term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long-
term series of option contracts. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Sample Period Mean     Median         Standard    Minimum     Maximum 
              Deviation 
 
Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Book Ratios 
 
Equally-weighted Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.6297  0.6315  0.0964  0.4213  0.8757  
 (L)  0.5359  0.5313  0.0646  0.4131  0.7645 
2000    
 (S)  0.6072  0.6021  0.0950  0.4312  0.8404 
 (L)  0.5267  0.5137  0.0576  0.4350  0.6736 
2001    
 (S)  0.6877  0.6878  0.0741  0.5261  0.8757 
 (L)  0.5645  0.5630  0.0685  0.4391  0.7645 
2002    
 (S)  0.5824  0.6014  0.0863  0.4213  0.7515 
 (L)  0.5116  0.5133  0.0517  0.4131  0.6441 
 
 
Equally-weighted Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.5890  0.5475  0.1325  0.3409  1.1599  
 (L)  0.5279  0.5268  0.0785  0.3407  0.7474 
2000    
 (S)  0.5914  0.5701  0.1087  0.4576  1.0324 
 (L)  0.5287  0.5242  0.0575  0.4360  0.6694 
2001    
 (S)  0.6184  0.5958  0.1570  0.3409  1.1599 
 (L)  0.5424  0.5378  0.0894  0.3407  0.7474 
2002    
 (S)  0.5585  0.5430  0.1082  0.3714  0.8984 
 (L)  0.5132  0.5214  0.0735  0.3705  0.7002 
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Table 17: (Continued) 
 
Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short-term and Long-term Option 
Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002  
 
(S) represents the summary of short-term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long-
term series of option contracts. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Sample Period Mean     Median         Standard    Minimum     Maximum 
              Deviation 
 
Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Book Ratios 
 
Value-weighted Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.6201  0.6362  0.1425  0.2989  0.9933  
 (L)  0.5098  0.5122  0.0988  0.3012  0.7817 
2000    
 (S)  0.6098  0.6233  0.1274  0.4012  0.8712 
 (L)  0.5052  0.4907  0.0877  0.3573  0.6979 
2001    
 (S)  0.7262  0.7355  0.0099  0.4439  0.9933 
 (L)  0.5673  0.5605  0.0837  0.4012  0.7817 
2002    
 (S)  0.5192  0.4936  0.1063  0.2989  0.7522 
 (L)  0.4546  0.4502  0.0851  0.3012  0.6522 
 
 
Value-weighted Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.5648  0.5516  0.0869  0.3415  0.8996  
 (L)  0.4585  0.4534  0.0577  0.3198  0.6656 
2000    
 (S)  0.5804  0.5486  0.0893  0.4681  0.8434 
 (L)  0.4584  0.4517  0.0442  0.3968  0.5763 
2001    
 (S)  0.5795  0.5725  0.0991  0.3796  0.8996 
 (L)  0.4697  0.4587  0.0723  0.3534  0.6656 
2002    
 (S)  0.5423  0.5465  0.0656  0.3451  0.6981 
 (L)  0.4474  0.4484  0.0436  0.3198  0.5389 
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Table 17: (Continued) 
 
Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short-term and Long-term Option 
Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002  
 
(S) represents the summary of short-term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long-
term series of option contracts. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Sample Period Mean     Median  Standard    Minimum   Maximum 
                Deviation 
 
Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Earning Ratios 
 
Equally-weighted Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.6407  0.6457  0.1237  0.4022  0.9984  
 (L)  0.4966  0.4989  0.0546  0.3585  0.7464 
2000    
 (S)  0.6229  0.6026  0.1048  0.4312  0.8824 
 (L)  0.5142  0.5125  0.0379  0.4216  0.6315 
2001  
 (S)  0.7173  0.7215  0.0965  0.4316  0.9984 
 (L)  0.5130  0.5151  0.0464  0.4068  0.7464 
2002    
 (S)  0.5726  0.5312  0.1135  0.4022  0.8915 
 (L)  0.4714  0.4611  0.0595  0.3585  0.6963 
 
 
Equally-weighted Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.5401  0.5367  0.0817  0.4138  0.8016  
 (L)  0.4859  0.4785  0.0549  0.3978  0.6336 
2000    
 (S)  0.5855  0.4785  0.0846  0.4773  0.8455 
 (L)  0.4981  0.4986  0.0487  0.3869  0.6652 
2001    
 (S)  0.5658  0.5779  0.0622  0.4315  0.7099 
 (L)  0.4875  0.4888  0.0419  0.3869  0.6012 
2002    
 (S)  0.5764  0.5757  0.0859  0.4138  0.8455 
 (L)  0.4956  0.4971  0.0502  0.3869  0.6652 
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Table 17: (Continued) 
 
Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short-term and Long-term Option 
Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002  
 
(S) represents the summary of short-term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long-
term series of option contracts. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Sample Period Mean     Median   Standard     Minimum    Maximum 
        Deviation 
 
Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Earning Ratios 
 
Value-weighted Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.6742  0.6665  0.1128  0.4171  1.2022  
 (L)  0.5195  0.5137  0.0703  0.3948  0.7675 
2000    
 (S)  0.6034  0.5970  0.0910  0.4171  0.8787  
 (L)  0.4777  0.4764  0.0653  0.3948  0.6937 
2001    
 (S)  0.6775  0.6661  0.1325  0.4660  1.2022 
 (L)  0.5547  0.5352  0.0774  0.4384  0.7675 
2002    
 (S)  0.7060  0.7121  0.0821  0.5600  0.9127 
 (L)  0.5052  0.5144  0.0443  0.4029  0.6395 
 
Value-weighted Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (S)  0.5937  0.5845  0.1204  0.3751  0.9642  
 (L)  0.5236  0.5201  0.0823  0.3502  0.7437 
2000    
 (S)  0.6726  0.6732  0.0781  0.5121  0.8215 
 (L)  0.6117  0.6169  0.0611  0.4988  0.7437 
2001    
 (S)  0.6393  0.6456  0.1133  0.4415  0.9642 
 (L)  0.5488  0.5514  0.0590  0.4121  0.6893 
2002    
 (S)  0.5079  0.4875  0.0888  0.3751  0.7979 
 (L)  0.4538  0.4547  0.0472  0.3502  0.5937 
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The following five statistics of mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum of implied volatilities are reported.  The level of long-term implied volatility is 
shown to be lower than the level of short-term implied volatility. The mean and median of the 
implied volatilities of the value portfolio are overall higher than those of growth portfolio for 
both short-term and long-term series. For the portfolios formed by price-to-book ratio, the 
mean and median of the implied volatilities are not very close between the equally-weighted 
and the value-weighted portfolios.  For the whole period from 2000 to 2002, the mean short-
term implied volatility of the equally-weighted value portfolio is 62.97%, whereas the growth 
portfolio is 58.90%.  The average long-term implied volatility is lower than the average short-
term implied volatility, 53.59% and 52.79% for value and growth portfolios respectively.  For 
the portfolios formed by price-to-earning ratio, the value portfolios also report a higher mean 
and a higher median for the implied volatility than the growth portfolios do. The mean for the 
short-term implied volatility of the equally-weighted value and the growth portfolios is 
64.07% and 54.01% respectively.  Nevertheless, the difference of the average long-term 
implied volatility of the value and the growth portfolios is not significant, 49.66% and 
54.01% respectively. 
The daily changes in the implied volatility of both growth and value portfolios in 
2001 are relatively high when comparing to 2000 and 2002.  Because the stock market got 
volatile starting early 2000, the level of implied volatility is not vastly different between the 
value and growth portfolios. 
 
V. 2 OLS Regression    
Table 18 shows the results of OLS regressions of LtV against 
S
tV to test whether the 
theoretical theta holds empirically, for the full sample period and for each year run separately.  
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Table 18:  
 
Regressions of the Long-term Implied Volatility onto the Short-term Implied Volatility 
of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
 
S
t
L
t VV *  Where 
L
tV is the long-term implied volatility; 
S
tV is the short-term implied volatility; 
α is the constant; θ is the coefficient; and ε is the error term. (E) represents the summary of equally-weighted 
series, and (V) represents the summary of value-weighted series. Sample size is 636 observations for each time 
series. 
 
 
Sample Period Constant Coefficient  T-Statistics Adjusted R2  
 
Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio 
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
 (E)  0.203  0.528   32.560   0.621 
 (V)  0.144  0.417   23.973   0.475 
2000    
 (E)  0.201  0.536   21.180   0.672 
 (V)  0.170  0.449   14.789   0.357 
2001    
 (E)  0.168  0.577   12.690   0.583 
 (V)  0.143  0.461   15.258   0.452 
2002    
 (E)  0.214  0.511   26.010   0.576 
 (V)  0.111  0.463   16.030   0.483 
  
Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
(E)  0.134  0.580   51.933   0.810 
 (V)  0.152  0.542   36.130   0.673  
2000   
(E)  0.140  0.558   24.431   0.587 
 (V)  0.273  0.319   18.340   0.612 
2001   
(E)  0.135  0.578   26.020   0.685 
 (V)  0.108  0.624   32.512   0.594 
2002  
 (E)  0.128  0.606   30.153   0.784 
 (V)  0.142  0.560   25.112   0.648 
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Table 18: (Continued) 
 
Regressions of the Long-term Implied Volatility onto the Short-term Implied Volatility 
of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002  
 
 
S
t
L
t VV *  Where 
L
tV is the long-term implied volatility; 
S
tV is the short-term implied volatility; 
α is the constant; θ is the coefficient; and ε is the error term. (E) represents the summary of equally-weighted 
series, and (V) represents the summary of value-weighted series. Sample size is 636 observations for each time 
series. 
 
 
Sample Period Constant Coefficient θ T-Statistics      Adjusted R2 
 
Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio 
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
(E)  0.287  0.328   27.889   0.551 
(V)  0.195  0.454   34.780   0.657 
2000   
(E)  0.353  0.259   11.470   0.432 
(V)  0.328  0.322   12.190   0.512 
 
2001   
(E)  0.228  0.426   14.980   0.578 
(V)  0.309  0.465   15.020   0.635 
    
2002   
(E)  0.294  0.306   11.910   0.514 
(V)  0.254  0.363   12.020   0.638 
 
Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
(E)  0.204  0.503   37.840   0.693 
 (V)  0.112  0.651   38.520   0.701 
2000   
(E)  0.237  0.449   23.970   0.712 
 (V)  0.141  0.585   28.740   0.638 
2001   
 (E)  0.163  0.582   15.780   0.695 
 (V)  0.128  0.654   21.550   0.717 
2002  
 (E)  0.161  0.580   25.300   0.521 
 (V)  0.165  0.543   23.470   0.468 
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The parameter of StV  indicates the empirical theta, the extent to which the long-term 
options react to the short-term options. If the parameter is 0.5, when the implied volatility of 
short-term option changes by 1% the implied volatility of long-term option would change by 
0.5%. For the full sample period from 2000 to 2002, the evidence on portfolios formed by 
price-to-book and price-to-earning provides consistent results that the growth portfolios tend 
to have higher empirical thetas than the value portfolios.  
For the full sample period, the portfolios of the equally-weighted growth portfolio and 
the value portfolio, which are formed by the price-to-book ratio, have the coefficients of 
0.580 and 0.528, respectively.  The difference of the coefficients of the value-weighted value 
portfolio and the growth portfolio is larger, with 0.542 and 0.417 respectively.  The long-term 
option series overreacts to short-term series for both value and growth portfolios.  Since the 
coefficients for the growth portfolios are relatively large in comparison to the value 
portfolios, the growth investors overreact to a greater degree than value investors.  
Decomposing the sample by year, the equally-weighted value portfolio reports the highest 
empirical theta of 0.577 in 2001, comparing to 0.536, and 0.511 in 2000 and 2002 
respectively. The equally-weighted growth portfolio has relatively high coefficients every 
year with the highest in 2002 at 0.606, and 0.558 and 0.578 in 2000 and 2001 respectively.   
For the full sample period, the portfolios formed by the price-to-earning ratio, the 
equally-weighted growth portfolio has a empirical theta of 0.503 in comparison with 0.328 
for the value portfolio for the whole sample period. The value-weighted growth portfolio 
reports a coefficient of 0.651 and value portfolio shows only 0.454.  The vast difference 
between empirical theta of the growth and the value portfolios suggests that there is 
fundamental difference between the value investors and the growth investors as reflected by 
their reaction to market volatility changes.  Decomposed by year, both the equally-weighted 
and the value-weighted growth and value portfolios have the highest coefficients in 2001. 
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The θcoefficients of the equally-weighted growth and the value portfolios are 0.582 and 
0.426 respectively, and those of the value-weighted growth and the value portfolios are 0.654 
and 0.465 respectively.   
 
V. 3 Test of Significance of Across Value and Growth Portfolios 
To have a comprehensive investigation on whether the degree of overreaction of 
growth stocks is higher than that of the value stocks, I apply different stock volatility models 
and estimate parameters needed for the calculation of theoretical implied volatility of the 
growth and the value portfolios.  
 
V.3.1. Derivation of Parameters 
Assuming the stochastic process of implied volatility follows a mean reversion 
process decaying geometrically back to its long-term mean, the serial correlation properties 
of the instantaneous volatility t are of interest to derive theoretical upper bounds for the 
elasticity of long-term implied volatility with respect to short-term implied volatility. The 
estimates of  at 4 days lag for the equally-weighted and the value-weighted value and 
growth portfolios are listed in Table 19.  
The equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios exhibit similar value of 
autocorrelation coefficients. However, the magnitude of autocorrelation differs between the 
growth and the value portfolios. For the portfolios classified by price-to-book ratio, the value 
portfolio represents higher autocorrelation of 0.942, than the growth of 0.897 for the equally-
weighted portfolios. For the portfolios classified by price-to-earning ratio, the growth 
portfolio has an autocorrelation of 0.935, whereas value portfolio has 0.888 for the equally-
weighted portfolios. 
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Table 19:  
 
Autocorrelation and Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Implied Volatility of Short-
Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 
2002 
 
Implied daily ρis the autocorrelation raised to the 1/n power, where n is the lag length in days. Sample size is 
636 observations for each time series. 
 
Lag length   Autocorrelation Partial Correlation    Implied daily ρ 
(days)          
 
Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio 
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
1 (E)  0.942 (0.040) 0.942 (0.040)   0.942  
     (V)  0.953 (0.040) 0.953 (0.040)   0.953 
 
2 (E)  0.897 (0.040) 0.088 (0.040)  0.947 
(V)  0.915 (0.040) 0.064 (0.040)   0.957 
  
3 (E)  0.854 (0.040) -0.002 (0.040)  0.949  
(V)  0.881 (0.040) 0.038 (0.040)  0.959 
 
4 (E)  0.814 (0.039) 0.014 (0.040)  0.950 
(V)  0.855  (0.039) 0.084 (0.040)  0.962 
    
Growth Portfolio: 
 
1 (E)  0.897 (0.040) 0.897 (0.040)   0.897  
 (V)  0.898 (0.040) 0.898 (0.040)   0.898 
 
2 (E)  0.751 (0.040) -0.280 (0.040)  0.867 
(V)  0.823 (0.040) 0.084 (0.040)   0.907 
  
3 (E)  0.624 (0.040) 0.067 (0.040)  0.855  
 (V)  0.754 (0.040) 0.009 (0.040)  0.910  
 
4 (E)  0.509 (0.039) -0.062 (0.040)  0.845 
(V)  0.682  (0.040) -0.045 (0.040)  0.909 
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Table 19: (Continued) 
 
Autocorrelation and Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Implied Volatility of Short-
Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 
2002  
 
Implied daily ρis the autocorrelation raised to the 1/n power, where n is the lag length in days. Sample size is 
636 observations for each time series. 
 
Lag length  Autocorrelation Partial Correlation        Implied daily ρ 
(days)          
 
Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio 
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
1 (E)  0.888 (0.040) 0.888 (0.040)   0.888  
     (V)  0.825 (0.040) 0.825 (0.040)   0.825 
 
2 (E)  0.827 (0.040) 0.180 (0.040)  0.942 
 (V)  0.794 (0.040) 0.354 (0.040)   0.891 
  
3 (E)  0.772 (0.040) 0.048 (0.040)  0.917  
 (V)  0.754 (0.040) 0.138 (0.040)  0.910 
 
4 (E)  0.724 (0.039) 0.028 (0.040)  0.922 
 (V)  0.718  (0.039) 0.062 (0.040)  0.921  
 
Growth Portfolio: 
 
1 (E)  0.935 (0.040) 0.935 (0.040)   0.935  
 (V)  0.929 (0.040) 0.929 (0.040)   0.929 
 
2 (E)  0.852 (0.040) -0.172 (0.040)  0.923 
(V)  0.878 (0.040) 0.112 (0.040)   0.937 
  
3 (E)  0.762 (0.040) -0.083 (0.040)  0.913  
 (V)  0.831 (0.040) 0.023 (0.040)  0.940  
 
4 (E)  0.676 (0.039) -0.011 (0.040)  0.907 
 (V)  0.785  (0.040) -0.007 (0.040)  0.941 
  
 
Using the daily stock returns of each portfolio classified by price-to-book and price-
to-earning ratios separately, I assume stock fluctuation specified by GARCH (1,2) model and 
estimate 210  and ,,   in Equation (7) to derive the unconditional variance 
2
  and to 
estimate the theoretical theta. The parameter estimates of the GARCH (1,2) and the value of 
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γ are reported in Table 20. The value and the growth portfolios have the values of γvarying 
within the range from 0.7865 to 0.9102.  
Table 20: 
 
Stock Return Test Statistics for a GARCH (1,2) Specification over the Sample Period 
from 2000 to 2002  
 
1
2
2
1

 ttttt rR    
 2 13
2
12
2
110
2

 tttt   
Where tR is the daily stock return, t is the stock volatility, r is the risk-free rate, λis the unit risk premium, 
210  and ,,  are independent parameters, and t  is Gaussian white noise. (E) represents the equally-
weighted option series, whereas (V) represents value-weighted option series. Sample size is 636 observations 
for each time series. 
 
Portfolios Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio:    
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio 
(E)   (V)   (E)    (V)
  
  
α0  0.00005  0.00002  0.00003  0.00004 
 
α1  0.1197   0.1145   0.1666   0.1798  
 
α2  0.7472   0.7752   0.7138   0.7304  
 
α3  -0.0012  -0.1528  0.1575   -0.1698
   
 
α1+α1  0.8669   0.8897   0.8804   0.9102 
 
Portfolios Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio: 
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio 
  (E)   (V)   (E)    (V) 
 
α0  0.00001  0.00001  0.00003  0.00004 
 
α1  0.0090   0.0109   0.0766   0.1056 
 
α2  0.8704   0.8820   0.7099   0.7499 
 
α3  0.0958   0.0763   0.0931   -0.1966 
 
α1+α1  0.8794   0.8929   0.7865   0.8555 
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The parameter estimates of EGARCH (1,1) models for the equally-weighted and 
value-weighted growth and the value portfolios are reported in Table 21.  
 
Table 21: 
 
Stock Return Test Statistics for an EGARCH (1,1) Specification over the Sample Period 
from 2000 to 2002  
 
ttttt rR  
2
2
1  
 )2( 1312
2
110
2

 
 tttLnLn  
Where tR is the daily stock return, t is the stock return volatility, 3210  and , ,,   are independent 
parameters, and t  is Gaussian white noise. (E) represents the equally-weighted option series, whereas (V) 
represents value-weighted option series. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
Portfolio Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio:      
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio  
  (E)   (V)   (E)   (V) 
 
α0  -0.5967  -1.3484  -0.4808  -1.2173
  
α1  0.9493   0.8886   0.9201   0.8369  
 
α2  0.2683   0.2607   0.6123   -0.0045
  
α3  -0.0704  -0.0618  0.0204   -0.2787
  
 
Portfolio Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio: 
 
Growth Portfolio     Value Portfolio 
  (E)   (V)   (E)   (V)  
 
α0  -0.3009  -0.2790  -0.3491  -1.2903 
 
α1  0.9594   0.8703   0.9547   0.7840 
 
α2  0.0474   0.0418   0.0697   0.1801 
  
α3  -0.1595  -0.1809  -0.1603  -0.1672 
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α1 is the key parameter that makes the theoretical theta different from that estimated 
under other specifications. Among all portfolios, the α1 estimates for the growth portfolio are 
slightly higher than the estimates for the value portfolio. For the portfolios formed by price-
to-book ratio, α1 equals to 0.9493 and 0.9201 for the equally-weighted growth and the value 
portfolios respectively, and 0.8886 and 0.8369 for the value-weighted portfolios respectively. 
The α1 estimates of portfolios classified by price-to-book ratio follow the similar pattern. The 
equally-weighted growth portfolio and the value portfolio report the value of α1, 0.9594 and 
0.9547 respectively, while the value-weighted growth and the value portfolio show 0.8703 
and 0.7840 respectively.  
As shown in Equation 15, the theoretical theta depends on both the decay parameter p 
and the time to expiration T of the short-term option series. Thus, theoretical theta varies over 
a range of values as p changes. The possible theoretical thetas for different p are calculated 
and presented in Table 22.  
Table 22: 
Theoretical Value of 
)1)((
)1(),(




T
nT
pnT
pTTp  
 represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long-term options with respect to that of the 
short-term options. p is the parameter estimate under different stock specifications. T is the time to expiration of 
the short-term option, and the time to expiration of the long-term option is n days longer than T.  (n=30 days for 
the Table) 
 
T =  p=0.7   p=0.8   p=0.9    p=0.95 
No. of days 
 
 
5  0.1717   0.2124   0.3401   0.5266 
 
10  0.2573   0.2800   0.3782   0.5430 
 
15  0.3349   0.3455   0.4161   0.5593 
 
20  0.4003   0.4047   0.4530   0.5755 
 
25  0.4546   0.4563   0.4882   0.5916 
 
29  0.5000   0.5006   0.5212   0.6042 
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Four p values and six possible terms to expiration ranging from 5 days to 30 days are 
used to calculate the theoretical theta. As the long-term option series in the study has one 
month longer time to expiration than the short-term series, the theoretical theta value ranges 
from 0.1768 to 0.6042, getting larger as p gets larger given the same time to expiration. For 
example, when p is 0.9 and the short-term option contract has 30 days to expiration, the 
theoretical value of theta is 0.5212. If the long-term options of a stock are priced rationally 
relative to the short-term options, then when the short-term volatility is one point above its 
mean, the long-term implied volatility should be at most about 0.5212 percent above its 
mean. Different p values under mean reversion, GARCH and EGARCH models are listed in 
Table 23. 
Table 23: 
 
Parameter Values under Different Stock Specifications for Value and Growth Portfolios 
for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
Theoretical value of elasticity of long-term implied volatilities relative to short-term implied volatilities is theta, 
)1)((
)1(),(




T
nT
pnT
pTTp . p is the parameter estimate under different stock volatility specifications.  
(E) represents the equally-weighted option series, whereas (V) represents value-weighted option series. Sample 
size is 636 observations for each time series. 
 
 
Portfolio Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio:      
 
Growth Portfolio   Value Portfolio 
(E)   (V)  (E)   (V) 
 
Mean Reversion 0.897   0.898  0.942   0.953  
GARCH  0.867   0.889  0.880   0.910  
EGARCH  0.949   0.889  0.920   0.837 
    
Portfolio Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio: 
 
Growth Portfolio   Value Portfolio  
   (E)   (V)  (E)   (V) 
 
Mean Reversion 0.935   0.929  0.888   0.825  
GARCH  0.879   0.893  0.787   0.856  
EGARCH  0.959   0.870  0.955   0.784  
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T tests in Table 24 enhance the regression results by comparing the daily actual long-
term implied volatility with the expected long-term implied volatility based on theoretical 
theta for the growth portfolios and the value portfolios to see whether there is a significant 
difference in the degree of overreaction between the two portfolios.  
Table 24: 
 
T-tests of the Difference between Value Portfolios and Growth Portfolios on the Mean 
Difference between the Actual and the Expected Long-Term Implied Volatility for the 
Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
The table shows the mean difference between the actual and the expected long-term implied volatility for each 
portfolio. The expected long-term volatility is calculated based on the theoretical theta 
)1)((
)1(),(




T
nT
pnT
pTTp . ),( Tp represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long-
term options with respect to that of the short-term options. p is the parameter estimate under different stock 
specifications. T is the time to expiration of the short-term option, and the time to expiration of the long-term 
option is n days longer than T. (E) represents the equally-weighted option series, whereas (V) represents the 
value-weighted option series. Sample size is 636 observations for each time series. ***, * represent the 1% and 
10% level of significance respectively.  
 
 
Models  Growth Portfolio Value Portfolio  Difference T-Stat  
       
Classified by Price-to-Book Ratio: 
 
Mean Reversion    
(E)   0.049   0.027   0.022  5.481*** 
(V)   0.011   0.004   0.007  0.852  
GARCH  
(E)   0.021   0.014   0.007  1.819*  
(V)   0.006   0.021   -0.015  -1.818* 
EGARCH 
(E)   0.083   0.045   0.038  7.988*** 
(V)   0.046   0.073   -0.027  -3.110***
  
Classified by Price-to-Earning Ratio: 
 
Mean Reversion    
(E)   0.026   0.008   0.018  2.840*** 
(V)   0.020   -0.004   0.024  2.445*** 
GARCH  
(E)   0.040   0.041   -0.001  -0.095  
(V)   0.028   0.005   0.023  2.340*** 
EGARCH 
(E)   0.036   0.032   0.004  0.440  
(V)   0.017   -0.006   0.023  2.558*** 
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The mean difference between the actual and the expected long-term implied volatility 
for each portfolio indicates the degree of overreaction of long-term options in respect to 
short-term options. The mean difference is positive for both the growth and the value 
portfolios formed by price to book ratio. However, when mean reversion and EGARCH 
models are applied to the stock volatility, the two value portfolios formed by price to earnings 
show negative mean differences, indicating that the average empirical long-term implied 
volatility is not higher than the theoretical one.  The significance of T-values shows the extent 
to which the growth portfolio is different from the value portfolio in terms of the degree of 
overreaction of long-term options in respect to short-term options. The higher the T-values, 
the larger the degree of overreaction the growth portfolios have than the value portfolios.  
 
V.3.2 Evidence on the Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Book Ratio 
For the portfolios formed by price-to-book ratio, the degree of overreaction of the 
equally weighted growth portfolios is significantly higher than that of the equally weighted 
value portfolios under different stock specifications. When implied volatility is assumed to 
revert to the mean level, the mean difference between the empirical long-term implied 
volatility and the theoretical long-term implied volatility of the growth portfolio is 
significantly higher than that of the value portfolio, with a T-value of 5.481, significant at the 
1% level of significance. Assuming the stock volatility is specified by GARCH (1,2) model, 
the error between the empirical value and the theoretical value is significantly higher for the 
growth portfolios than for the value portfolios at the 10% level of significance. For the 
EGARCH specifications, the equally-weighted growth portfolios also show a higher degree 
of overreaction as the T-value is 7.988, significant at the 1% level of significance. 
For the value-weighted portfolios, the growth portfolios do not overreact significantly 
to a larger degree than the value portfolios. In contrast, when the GARCH (1,2) and the 
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EGARCH (1,1) stock specifications are assumed, the value portfolios tend to overreact to a 
larger degree with T-values of 1.818 and 3.110, significant at the 1% and the 10% levels of 
significance respectively. However, when mean reversion is assumed, the mean difference 
between the empirical long-term implied volatility and the theoretical long-term implied 
volatility of the growth portfolios is higher, though not significantly higher, than that of the 
value portfolios. This implies that the relatively large degree of overreaction of the growth 
portfolios might be the results of the overreaction of some small growth stocks in the value-
weighted growth portfolios. 
 
V.3.3 Evidence on the Portfolios Formed by Price-to-Earning Ratio 
For the portfolios formed by price-to-earning ratio, the difference between the 
empirical long-term implied volatility and the theoretical long-term implied volatility of the 
equally-weighted growth portfolios is significantly higher than that of the equally-weighted 
value portfolios under mean reversion specification at the 1% level of significance, indicating 
a greater degree of overreaction. However, When GARCH and EGARCH models are 
assumed for stock volatility, the difference between the growth and the value portfolios is not 
significant. For the comparison between the value-weighted growth and the value portfolios, 
the mean reversion, GARCH, and EGARCH models consistently report T-values of 2.445, 
2.340, and 2.558 respectively, significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Overall, the empirical results on the growth and the value portfolios built by different 
criteria show that the degree of overreaction of long-term options in respect to short-term 
options of the growth portfolios is higher than that of the value portfolios. While most of the 
value portfolios overreact, there are a few exceptions that long-term options of the value 
portfolios classified by price-to-earning ratio are shown not to overreact. Among twelve 
comparisons between the growth and the value portfolios across different specifications of 
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stock movements, the growth portfolios largely overreact to a larger degree than the value 
portfolios, consistent with overreaction as an explanation to the value effect.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Using the up-to-date option data from the Prophet Financial Systems from 2000 to 
2002, I investigate whether the growth investors overreact to a larger degree than the value 
investors by Stein’s (1989) mean reversion model and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst’s (1994) 
GARCH and EGARCH methods. To check for robustness, I form portfolios by price-to-book 
and price-to-earning ratios and obtain the time series data on both the equally-weighted and 
the value-weighted basis. The value and the growth portfolios taken from Standard & Poor’s 
100 stocks show that the growth investors largely overreact to a larger degree than the value 
investors. 
The empirical results from the comparison of the degree of the overreactions between 
the value and the growth portfolios using implied volatility from option prices contributes to 
the existing literature as a support to overreaction as an explanation to the value effect. 
Investors holding different portfolios are fundamentally different and have different 
expectations on the future volatility of the portfolios. This implies that investors are not well 
diversified, and instead overreact more to news for growth stocks than for value stocks.  
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